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Description of Validity and Reliability for Major Variables, Chippewa County Youth Project

Prepared by

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and

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I. Introduction

As has been noted:

Over the last two or three decades a body of knowledge of certain Blay & Dun. types of "status attainment processes" has been built up. We now know a great deal about the influence of several factors on one's educational and Nay nothing abut aspicke occupational aspirations and attainments. These factors include parental (Cenell, Holle, M. Portis, 1969; Office Alle status, measured intelligence, performance in school, the examples set by 1974) a person's "significant others," and the expectations they hold for him Woelfel and Ibeller, 1971; Heller & Welfel 1972) Twota a thy have been tested The most productive variables Blau and Duncan, 1967; Sewell, al., 1971). for explaining status differences have been turned out to be social psychological status isomorphs. For educational status attainment, these are educational ins, a class of aspirations of youth and educational expectations of their significant For, occupational status attainment, they are occupational aspirations others. demons. Valid, of youth and occupational expectations of their significant others. reliable, and economical instruments have been developed by which to measure each of the above variables, and regression models by which to estimate their linkages have been formulated and successfully tested. Between onehalf and two-thirds of the variance in years of education completed and of the occupational prestige level of adults is explained by these models. Yet as they stand, they explain only 10-15 percent of the variance in income ronely resent levels of adults WThere are at present no instruments by which to measure any of the status isomorphs for either income or political influence or to measure political influence status in survey research. There is good reason to believe that if the techniques could be developed by which to measure these variables they might well function as efficiently in their own domains as do the status isomorph variables pertaining to education and occupation (Haller and Portes, 1973).

In a project carried out by a research team under the direction of A.O. Haller, instruments were developed by which to measure youth's aspirations, for an^d their "significant others" expectations for the youths requiring future levels of income and political influence. This report will summarize the reliability and validity of those instruments. Figure 1 identifies the four status variables, in creating those variables which are described in the present paper.

1. The Political Aspiration Scale

A. Description of the scale.

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The Political Influence Aspiration Scale is a four item scale which measures youth's aspirations for future political influence at local, state, and federal levels of government. The four questions cover two dimensions of aspirations which are Idealistic, Realistic and Short Term, Long Term. is designed to the interference (ST) political influence aspirations. Question two addresses Realistic (R), Short Term (ST) political influence aspirations. Question three addresses Idealistic (I), Long Term (LT) political influence aspirations. Question four addresses Realistic (R), Long Term (LT) political influence aspirations. Me Mendy Wardhy M presents Tothl,

The sample consists of 292 members of the Junior class of Chippewa Falls High School. Data was collected by the research team in the spring Suff-administ gus, kno une filled by the in I chaol. of 1976. The sample is split approximately evenly across sex. (Males:

S. Scoring of the Scale.

Possible scores on each item range from 0-3 with 0 = no influence aspirations, 1 = local influence aspirations, 2 = state influence aspirations, 3 = national influence aspirations. The political influence scale is a

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B____Sample.

simple summation of the scores on each of the four items.

Table 1 presents The distribution of responses to the items on the a_{re} presents e_{re} presents e_{re} Political Aspiration Scale. The first question, that dealing with short term idealistic influence, reveals that the majority of youth limit their aspirations to the local level, and that nearly one-third have no political aspirations whatsoever. Less than 10% of the sample feels that, in the best of all possible worlds, they will exercise state or national influence by the time they are twenty-five.

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When these same youth are asked for their realistic short-term political aspirations, the question essentially reduces to a dichotomy. Either a youth intend to participate not at all, or is only confident in his ability to be locally influential. Not a single respondent expressed the belief that state or national influence was a realistic aspiration by age twenty-five.

The pattern of responses to the long-term idealistic question is markedly different from that of the short-term idealistic question. While a quarter of the sample still shows no interest in future political activity, we now find a sizable proportion who believe that they can conceivably exert state influence (43.4%), and an appreciable proportion who ideally aspire toward being influential nationally (8.5%). When we turn to longterm realistic, however, we are again left with what is fundamentally a dicotomy between no participation at all and participation at a local level only. We do find that 41.7% of the sample considers state influence to be a realistic aspiration when they are 45 years of age, but here again not a \mathcal{N} single respondent states definitively that he will be nationally influential at this stage of life.

C <u>Validity</u>.

Two types of validity evidence is available. The first is an internal evidence of validity. As Haller and Miller (1971) note, "General level of aspiration theory and research holds that, on the average, level of aspiration at the idealistic level is higher than level of aspiration at the realistic level, and similarly that level of aspiration in terms of long-range goals is higher than level of aspiration in terms of short-range goals." Given this fact, we would predict that X RST < X RLT and X RLT < X ILT. As we see in Figure 2 these relations hold. Further, we would expect: \overline{X} RST < \overline{X} RLT and \overline{X} IST < \overline{X} ILT. We see in Figure 2 that this is also the case. We take this as evidence of the internal validity of the Political Aspiration Scale. The second type of validity evidence that is available is construct validity evidence. Construct validity refers to the process of evaluating a construct by empirical tests of predictions concerning its behavior in relation to that of other variables. Several scales have been used as construct validity tests for the Political Aspiration Scale. These include the Government Office Aspiration Scale which was constructed especially for this study. The scale questions youths about their desire to hold various government jobs in the future. The scale is constructed analogously to the Occupational Aspiration Scale (see Haller and Miller, 1971). The alpha coefficient for this scale is .622. Also included is a standard 5 item political efficacy scale with an alpha coefficient of .412. A political interest variable with a test/retest stability coefficient of and a nine item political knowledge scale described in Olson (1977). The political knowledge scale has an alpha coefficient of .813.

Cite a good valid. 4, descensor J. valid. 4, If the Political Aspiration Scale is a valid instrument we would predict a positive relationship between the Political Influence Aspiration Scale and each of the other measures. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among these scales. As is evidenced in Table 2 the predicted positive relationships between the political Aspiration Scale and each of the other above mentioned scales hold. We take this as evidence supporting the construct validity of the Political Influence Aspiration scale.

E. <u>Reliability</u>.

Two measures of reliability are available for the Political Influence Aspiration Scale. The first is the alpha coefficient which measures the internal consistency of the scale. Table 3 presents the new item and item to total correlations for the Political Influence Aspiration Scale. The alpha coefficient for the scale is .841. We believe that this shows the Political Aspiration Scale to have high reliability. The second measure of reliability is the test/retest coefficient, which measures stability of the scale across time. The test/retest coefficient for the political aspiration scale is .328. This low coefficient calls into question the stability, thus the reliability, of the scale.

E. Conclusion.

On the basis of these findings we saw that the Political Influence Aspiration Scale has adequate face and construct validity. In addition, the alpha coefficient is very high showing evidence of the promising reliability of the Political Influence Aspirations Scale. However, the stability of the measure is very low. This would lead one to believe that while at any particular measurement application, youth can answer these questions in an interpretable manner, across time, their answers change.

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That is, their answers have very little stability. Given that reliability men the sets an upper limit on validity, the use of this scale on high school youth ont. We use is called into question.

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III. The Income Aspiration Scale

A. Description of the Scale.

The Income Aspiration Scale is a four item scale which measures students' aspirations for future family income. The four questions cover two dimensions of aspirations which are Idealistic (I), Realistic (R), and Short Term (ST), Long Term (LT). Question one addresses Idealistic (I) Short Term (ST) family income aspirations. Question two addresses Realistic (R) Short Term (LT) family income aspirations. Question three addresses Idealistic (I) Long Term (LT) family income aspirations. And question four addresses Realistic (R) Long Term (LT) family income aspirations.

B. Scoring of the Scale.

Possible scores on each item range from 00-50. The scores refer to income aspirations ranging from \$00 to \$50,000. The Income Aspiration Scale is a simple summation of the scores on each of the four items. [Table 4 \mathcal{W} \mathcal{W} presents the interitem and item to total score correlations for the Income Aspiration Scale.]

C. Validity.

Two types of validity evidence are available. The first is an internal evidence of validity. (See note under validity for Political Influence Aspirations Scale.) We would predict that $\overline{X}RST < \overline{X}RLT$ and $\overline{X}RLT < \overline{X}ILT$. As we see in Figure 3, these relationships hold. Further, we would expect that $\overline{X}RST < \overline{X}RLT$ and $\overline{X}IST < \overline{X}ILT$. We see in Figure 3 that this is also the case. We take this as evidence of the internal validity of the Income Aspiration Scale.

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The second type of validity evidence that is available is construct validity. (See note under Political Influence Aspirations Scale, validity.) Two scales have been used as construct validity tests for the income aspiration scale. These are first, a House Aspiration Scale. The scale asks youth to identify the price of house they would like to own in the future. It is a four item scale. The four questions cover two dimensions of aspirations which are Idealistic, Realistic, and Short Term, Long Term. Question one addressed Idealistic (I), Short Term (ST) house ownership aspirations. Question two addresses Realistic (R), Short Term (LT) house ownership aspirations. Question three addresses Idealistic (I), Long Term (LT) house ownership aspirations. Question four addresses Realistic (R), Long Term (LT) house ownership aspirations. Possible scores on each item range from 01-15 with 01 = 10,000 to 15 = 100,000. The House Aspiration Scale is a simple summation of the scores on each of the four items. The alpha coefficient for the scale is .836.

The second scale is the Car Aspiration Scale which asks youths to identify the type of car they would like to own in the future. It is a four-item scale. The four questions cover two dimensions of aspirations which are Idealistic, Realistic, and Short Term, Long Term. Question one addresses Idealistic (I), Short Term (ST) car ownership aspirations. Question two addresses Realistic (R), Short Term (ST) car ownership aspirations. Question three addresses Idealistic (I) Long Term (LT) car ownership aspirations. Question four addresses Realistic (R), Long Term (LT) car ownership aspirations. Possible scores on the items range from 1-3 with 1 = economy car, 2 = mid-sized car, 3 = luxury car. The Car Aspiration Scale is a simple summation of the four items. The alpha coefficient for the Car Aspiration Scale is .364.

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If the Income Aspiration Scale is a valid measure we would predict a positive relationship between the Income Aspiration Scale and the Car and House Aspiration Scales. Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, and the zero-order correlations among these scales. We note in Table 4 that there are positive but small relationships between the Income Aspirations measure and the other two aspiration measures. The evidence for or against the Income Aspiration Scale, however, must take into account the unreliability of the Car Measure as evidenced by its alpha coefficient. Overall we would hold that the relationship between the Income Aspiration Scale and the House and Car Aspiration Scales provided some evidence for the construct validity of the Income Aspiration Scale.

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D. Reliability.

Two measures of the reliability are available for the Income Aspiration Scale. The first is the alpha coefficient which measures the internal consistency of the scale. Table 5 presents the Inter Item and Item to total correlations for the Income Aspiration Scale. The alpha coefficient for the scale is .847. We believe that this shows the Income Aspirations Scale to have high reliability. The second measure of reliability is the test/retest coefficient which measures stability of the scale across time. The test/ retest coefficient for the Income Aspiration Scale is .237. This low coefficient calls into question the stability, thus the reliability of the scale.

E. Conclusion.

On the basis of these findings we can say that the Income Aspiration Scale has adequate face validity and somewhat less adequate construct validity. In addition, the alpha coefficient is very high showing evidence of the promising reliability of the Income Aspiration Scale. However, the stability of the measure is very low. This would lead one to believe that while at any particular measurement application, youth can answer these questions in an interpretable manner, across time, their answers change. That is, their answers have very little stability. Given that reliability sets an upper limit on validity, the usage of this scale on high school youth is called into question.

IV. Significant Other Elicitor: Political and Income Forms

A. Concurrent with the administration of the Income and Political Influence Aspiration Scales, the 292 youth were asked to identify the names of those people who had aided themain the formation of their political and income aspirations. Figure 4 illustrates the framework by which the Significant Other Elicitor, Political Form was developed. The Significant Other Elicitor, Income Form was developed in an analogous fashion.

For each individual listed the youth was asked to identify the following:NameAddressPhone No.Relationship to Youth

B. Sample

Owing to financial constraints, the analysis of Significant Other's expectations was limited to a sample of 59 randomly selected youth of which 56 finally presented usable data. For each of these 56 youth a maximum of three individuals were contacted. These significant others were asked about their expectations for the focal youth's future income and political statuses.

All Significant Others identified were considered to be both political and income significant others, regardless of whether or not they were explicitly named as such by the youth. Therefore, in many cases individuals were used as significant others for a given respondent whether or not the

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youth named that individual as a significant other for a particular status area. This conceivably represents a considerable problem, but the restricted sample necessitated this procedure.

V. The Political Expectation Scale

A. Description of the Scale.

The Political Expectation Scale was designed to be isomorphic with the previously described Political Aspiration Scale, with the only difference being that SO's are here asked to specify their political expectations for the youths who have named them as their SO's. The scoring too is similar, except that the average of any given youth's SO's expectations was used to correct for the fact that not all youths have the same number of SO's.

Table 6 presents the distribution of responses to the items on the Political Expectations Scale. Comparing these with Table 1, we find that, in general, Significant Others tend to expect more from youth than the youth do from themselves. SO's are both less likely than youths to state that a youth will exercise no influence at all, and more likely to state that the youth will be influential at higher levels. Whether the apparent optimism and encouragement of the SO's or the apparent skepticism and disinterest of the youth's is more realistic is of course an empirical question, yet these tables do seem to indicate that expectations seem to be higher than aspirations.

B. Reliability of Individual Significant Other Political Scales.

Table 7 consists of 18 unique correlation matrices. The coding schemes found along the rows and columns consists of three numbers. The first pertains to time, with "1" corresponding to the initial testing instrument and "2" corresponding to the retest. The second number indicates whether we are dealing with the first, second, or third SO. The third number refers to

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one of four questionnaire items. Thus, each of the top three matrices along the main diagonal contains inter-item correlations for a given SO at Time 1, while the bottom three matrices present this information for the retest. The three matrices denoted with the bold lines present testretest inter-item correlations, holding constant the designation of the SO. Thus, these three matrices contain estimates of stability. The cells denoted by colored lines present intra-class correlations among SO expectations at Time 1 (green) and Time 2 (red). The remaining six matrices contain correlations that are cross-time and cross-SO, and are somewhat less substantively interpretable.

In interpreting the table, it is important to note that since not all youths have the same number of significant others, SO1>SO2>SO3. Thus, we would expect the estimates in the first cell along the main diagonal to be more reliable than those in the second cell, which would in turn be more reliable than those in the third matrix, with a similar pattern holding for the bottom three matrices. The same reasoning can be applied elsewhere in the table.

The main diagonal of matrices in Table 7 would seem to indicate extremely good inter-item correlations for Significant Others Political Expectations, as these numbers range anywhere from .56 to .86. We believe that these numbers are indicative of the validity of the scale.

Our estimates of test-retest inter-item correlations are less encouraging. While eight of these twelve correlations are in the range of .46 to .79, which would seem to be acceptable, we also obtain four estimates below .40, including one as low as .11. These results again suggest the exercise of caution in using the Political Expectations Scale.

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For the most part, our estimates of intra-class correlations are fairly distressing. We find that individuals named as significant others by the youths are in little agreement among themselves as to the youth's political promise. Well over half of the entries in these six cells are negative, and even the largest estimates indicate little consensus among significant others expectations. Basically, we find a vast difference in what designated significant others expect from youth.

C. <u>Reliability and Validity of Total Significant Other Political</u> <u>Expectation Scale</u>.

Figure 5, analogous to Figure 2, displays a pattern of means which points to the internal validity of the scale. All predicated relations hold.

Table 8 presents the Inter-item and item to total correlations for the Political Expectation Scale. The Alpha coefficient for the Political Expectation Scale is .993, and the test-retest is .954. We believe that this indicates a reliable scale.

D. Correlation of Political Aspirations and Political Expectations.

Table 9 shows the correlations of the Political Aspiration questions with the corresponding Political Expectation questions. Since the entries along the main diagonal represent the correlations of similar concepts asked of the youths and their SO's (for example, short term idealistic), we might expect these correlations to be the highest in the table. We do not, however, find this to be the case, and in fact the correlation between the two scales overall is only .13.

The only real apparent pattern in the table is the relatively large size of the correlations in Row 2, those pertaining to realistic, shortterm political aspirations. This item might, prima facie, be considered

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the most reliable, or at least the most believable, of these eight questions, but even these correlations are modest.

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While these results may call into question the validity of these two scales, they may also be accurately reflecting the real world. High school youths may easily have extremely unclear and not fully crystallized conceptions of their future places in the political realm. Perhaps most have seldom if ever even considered these issues. Further, it is possible that the significant others do not find their conceptions of youth's political potential to be particularly salient to their lives. Finally, even if the "true" correlation between aspirations and expectations is much higher than the observed correlation of .13, any errors in the elicitation and identification of significant others could serve to attenuate the observed correlation.

E. Conclusion.

why ant rap the In sum, the Political Expectations Scale seems to be both valid and reliable. Unfortunately, we are here unable to assess the construct St orten validity of the scale as we did with the Political Aspirations Scale, since the appropriate validating constructs are not available. We thus base our assessment of the scale on the alpha coefficient, a test-retest coefficient, and the information contained in Figure 5.

VI. The Income Expectation Scale

A. Description of the Scale.

Again, this scale is analogous to the Income Aspiration Scale, except that it is asked of a different kind of respondent.

B. Reliability of Individual Significant Others Income Expectations.

Table 10 contains data on Significant Others Income Expectations, and is constructed in the same way as Table 7. In general, the entries along the main diagonal of matrices represent satisfactory inter-item correlations. The large size of the entries in the final cell may be a bit puzzling, but it should be remembered that these estimates are based on a very limited sample size (n=22).

The estimates of test-retest inter-item correlations are also quite good. Following the main diagonal of the appropriate three matrices (since the off-diagonal entries are cross-item, cross-time, and not as substantively interesting or informative), we observe stability estimates which average (unweighted by number of significant others) about .57. While not overwhelming, this does indicate that significant others answer fairly consistently across time.

Finally, we turn to our estimates of intra-class correlations. Here we find considerable diversity within any given cell, and are hardpressed to discern any clear patterns. What have The antribute

In sum, these tables present a great deal of numerical information, //a and we cannot comment on it in great depth at this time. What is interesting in the table depends largely on what the reader wishes to discover, as the table is designed to address a number of substantive and methodological questions.

C. <u>Reliability and Validity of Total Significant Others Income</u> Expecations Scale.

Figure 6 once again indicates a predictable and consistent pattern of means for realistic and idealistic short term and long term expectations.

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Table 11 presents the Inter-item and Item to total correlations for the Total Significant Other Income Expectation Scale. The Alpha coefficient for the scale is .884, and the test-retest is .699. We interpret those as being extremely promising.

D. Correlations Between Income Aspirations and Income Expectations.

With very few exceptions, Table 12 consists of entries which are virtually indistinguishable from zero. Both the cross-respondent interitem correlations and the total to total correlation suggest to us that their is little apparent correspondence between the economic success that a youth hopes to attain and the economic success expected from him by his SO's. In fact, 19 of the 25 correlations in the table are negative, again raising some skepticism regarding the validity of our scales.

Here again, though, as in the case of political aspirations and expectations, we would suggest that neither youth nor significant others necessarily have well crystallized attitudes regarding future earnings potential. We would argue that the observed correlation of 0.06 may Λ reflect the true state of affairs at the time of measurement, but that this correlation may easily increase over time.

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E. Conclusion.

As in the case of the Political Aspiration Scale, we can perform no tests of construct validity, but on the basis of the evidence at hand, we conclude that the Income Aspiration Scale is an apparently valid and reliable instrument.

VII. Regression Analysis

A. Introduction.

In this section we present the results of a regression analysis designed to assess the determinants of income and political aspirations and expectations.

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The results presented here should be considered both tentative and exploratory. First of all, we are dealing with only 56 cases, which limits both the number of independent variables we may employ in any given equation, and the confidence we may put in any of our estimates. Further, as noted above, the reliability of many of our variables is less than optimal, and this too tempers our confidence in the estimates we report. We thus consider this section to be both a check on the validity of our instruments and concepts and an analysis of substantive questions.

B. Political.

The variables to be used in this section are described as follows. VARIABLES

High School Grade Point Average (GPA)

This is the school reported average of the students course work. Sex (SEX)

This is coded "1" for females and "0" for males.

College Plans (COLPLAN)

This is coded as a dummy variable, with students planning on attending post-secondary institutions awarding transferable credits receiving a "1" and all others, including those planning on attending vocational schools, receiving a "0".

Residence (RESID)

Students living in rural areas, i.e., on a farm, were assigned a "1". All others were given a "0".

Political Interest (POLINT)

This is a single item indicator which assesses the respondent's interest in political affairs. Possible scores on the item range from 1 to 4.

Political Knowledge (TPOLK)

This measure was developed by project personnel and Olson (1977), and is intended to measure the person's ability to identify offices in the current political structure. It consists of a nine-item scale containing questions about all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) asked concerning all three levels of government (local, state, and federal). In each question, we asked respondents to identify the office with the most authority in that particular branch of government at a particular governmental level. As an example of this type of question, we asked:

Which of these offices has the most authority in legislative matters on the federal level? Would it be U.S. Senator, U.S. Secretary of Defense, or Attorney General?

Total scores on the scale range from 0 to 9, with high values indicating a greater number of correct answers.

Sense of Political Efficacy (POLEFF)

This is a five-item, scale with possible scores ranging from 0 to 5. High values correspond to a high sense of person effectiveness in regards to politics. For an extensive review of the concept of political efficacy, see Prewitt, 1968, pp. 225-228.

Table 13 presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of the above variables.

Table 14 presents the results of equations in which the dependent variable is Total Significant Others Political Expectation. The first equation shows a highly significant effect of Total SO Political Status on expectations, which is only slightly dampened when Total Political Aspirations and Political Interest are added to the equation. Surprisingly, aspirations have virtually no effect on expectations, and interest is of only marginal importance. The reader familar with the Significant Other literature will, of course, wonder why we here regressed expectations on aspirations, when most theory suggests that the direction of causation proceeds in the other direction. We specified our equations in this manner in order to determine how an SO develops his expectations. That is, we were interested in knowing whether these expectations were derived more from the characteristics of the youth or of the SO. For these particular equations (that is, those in which aspirations are considered exogenous to expectations), therefore, aspirations may perhaps better be thought of as a proxy for the youth's presentation of his political potential than as his actual level of aspirations.

We interpret the above aspect as indicating that the expectations that an SO has for a youth are conditioned mainly by the SO's own status, and much less by measured characteristics of the youth. More successful SO's seem to expect more political success from youth, whether or not the youth expect it from themselves.

Equation 4 indicates that while SO's expect much more from boys than they do from girls, the effect of sex only slightly attenuates the direct effect of the status of the SO. The next equation shows that even though girls have lower political aspirations than do boys, the addition of the aspiration variable adds nothing to the predictive power of the model, and does not appreciably affect the estimated effects of those variables already in the equation.

The next several equations basically attempts to make the main TSPS effect "go away." The results show that such characteristics as grade point average, farm residence, and educational plans all contribute

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significantly to SO expectations, yet in no case are any of these variables more important than the direct effect of the political status of the SO.

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It is somewhat striking that after controlling for the effects of TSPS, farm residence has a substantial effect on expectations. Whether this is an idiosycracy of the present sample (see above discussion of the rationale for the sample selection), or a genuine effect of rural origin is unclear, but the finding is suggestive.

In Table 15 we try to explain how a youth's political aspirations are determined. Possibly the most interesting comparison is between equations 1 and 3. The first equation basically shows that being male increases one's political aspirations, but that being bright or coming from a farm background have little effect. Equation 3 indicates that neither sense of political efficacy, political interest, or political knowledge does much to increase one's aspirations. While the presence of unreliability in the measurement of some of those variables means that their effects are being underestimated to some degree, it should be noted that none of these variables even approach statistical, let alone substantive, significance.

The final equation certainly contains entirely too many variables and must be interpreted very cautiously, but it does suggest that equations 1 and 3 were subject to various suppressor effects, since several of these variables now attain statistical significance. We will thus offer these variables as potentially important if and when larger samples become available.

C. Income.

We paid somewhat less attention to the income variables in our analysis, but Table 16 indicates, not surprisingly, that SO's expect the greatest economic success to be achieved by bright boys. Table 17 suggests that a youth's income aspirations are more closely related to his educational aspirations than to his other measured traits, and that here too there is virtually no relationship between aspirations and expectations. While the stutt of were placed by the poly with the poly were placed by the placed by the placed by the persistent relat: insignificant effect of sex is striking, this is very probably a result of the fact that income aspirations refer to family rather than personal income.

D. Conclusion.

In summary, we are most struck by the robust and persistent relationship between the political status of an SO and his political expectations for flere a youth. As previously mentioned, we would argue that expectations are paper more a function of the characteristics of the SO than those of the youth. Whether or not this pattern also holds for income has not yet been determined. monthill

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We also find that continual negative effects of sex (i.e., the disadvantages associated with being female) to be of interest. Our results show that while girls display higher measured achievement in high school than do boys (r =.402), girls both expect less from themselves-both politically and economically-and also find others to expect less from them. While these lowered aspirations and expectations may in fact be realistic responses to extant political and economic structural conditions, we might suggest that these are not terribly encouraging results for those interested in more egalitarian access to these spheres.

VIII. Summary

The preceeding paper has identified a problem in the stratification literature, and has described a project designed to assess this problem. Included in the discussion were methods of data collection, sample description,

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operationalization of variables, measurement issues of validity and

reliability, and a multivariate analysis of the data.

Variables Required by the Haller-Parts Status Attainment Model for Four Status Variables^{a,b}

		Early'SI	gnificant Others	Egoli Ego	8 8: Both
• .	Status Content Variables	Meań Status Levels	Mean Status Expectation Levels for Egos	Status Aspiration Level	Status Attainment Level
Same S	(Occupational) Prestige,Level			1	
	Education Level				
	Power (Public) Level Infirme)	X	X	X	X
	Monthay Miles Wealth Eavel (income)		X	x	

^aTable adapted from Haller and Portes 1973, p. 78

^bCells with X's refer to variables dealt with in present paper.

Internal Validity of Political Aspiration Scale N=292

 \bar{X} RST < \bar{X} IST .4103 .9414 \bar{X} RLT < \bar{X} ILT .6598 1.4639 \bar{X} RST < \bar{X} RLT .4103 .6598 \bar{X} IST < \bar{X} ILT

X IST < X ILT .9414 1.4639

Internal Validity of Income Aspiration Scale N=292

 X
 RST <</td>
 X
 IST

 15.028
 19.8962

 X
 RLT <</td>
 X
 ILT

 21.821
 28.007

 X
 RST
 X
 RLT

 15.028
 21.821
 28.1821

 X
 RST
 X
 RLT

 X
 RST
 X
 RLT

 X
 RST
 X
 RLT

 X
 RST
 X
 RLT

 X
 IST
 X
 ILT

19.896 28.007

Framework of the Significant Other Elicitor Political Form

There are four pages on each S.O. questionnaire. Each one of these pages tries to elicit a slightly different type of influence:

	DEFINERS	MODELS
	EXAMPLE QUESTION:	EXAMPLE QUESTION:
CE1 E	Who have you <u>talked</u> to about how you could do some good by work- ing with public officials?	Who do you know who provides an <u>example</u> of the good <u>you</u> might do when working with public officials?
JELF	student actually talked to about his role in the political realm.	The focus is on someone who the student uses as a model for him- self. Feeling elicited should be: "I'd like to be like that person some day!"
	EXAMPLE QUESTION:	EXAMPLE QUESTION:
	Who have you talked to about the good that public officials can do for people?	Who by their example (as public officials past or present) have given you an idea about the good
OBJECT	Focus is on someone whom the student has actually talked to about what people can do for others when they are public officials.	that public officials can do for people? The focus is on someone who the student uses as a model of what a public office holder should be like.
	ł	

In addition, on each page there are four filter questions; by this we mean that people think about (for example) political influence in many ways. We believed in this instance that there were at least four ways that the student might think about political influence. They were: 1) the ability to do good for others as a result of political influence; 2) the way that political influence might help you get ahead, e.g. Who have you talked to about how you might get ahead by becoming active in politics?; 3) the lawmaking function of political influence, e.g. Who have you talked to about how you could have a say about the kinds of laws that are passed?; 4) the type of life that public officials lead, e.g. Who do you know that provides an example of the kind of life you might lead as a public official?

Obviously, there may be other ways of thinking about political influence, these are the ones that we have used.

There are four things that we are trying to find out about people. This form identifies No. 3.

- 1. Their actual attainment levels (phase one) What do adults actually do?
- 2. Students aspirations for the future (phase two) What do kids want in the future?
- Students significant others (phase 2) Who has helped them decide what 3. they want in the future?
- Significant others expectations (phase three) What do these people 4. actually expect the student will do in the future?

Internal Validity of Political Expectation Scale (N=33)

x̃rst < x̃∣st .58 .86

 \vec{X} RLT < \vec{X} 1LT .80 1.41 \vec{X} RST < \vec{X} RLT

.58 .80

X IST < X ILT .86 1.41

Internal Validity of Income Expectation Scale (N=22)

X RST <	X IST
12.32	17.97
₹ RLT <	X ILT
18.96	27.49
X RST <	X RLT
12.32	18.96
x ist <	X ILT
17.97	27.49

Questions and Distribution of Responses for Political Aspiration Scale

Q1.

Suppose things work out so that you could be as influencial as you have ever hoped to be. Which is the highest of these levels of government at which you might succeed in getting elective officials to take action you think is important, by the time you are 25 years old.

120 90 57 23	41.1 30.8 19.5 7.9	0. _1. _2. _3.	None of the above City or county State National
		9.	Not ascertained
292	100.0		

%

Ν

N

%

Q2. Suppose things work out so that you are not very influencial. Which is the lowest of these levels at which you are sure you could succeed in getting elective officials to take action you think is important by the time you are 25 years old.

184	63.0	0.	None of the above
97	33.2	1.	City or county
5	1.7	2.	State
- <u>2</u>	<u>.7</u>	э.	Not ascertained
292	100.0	9.	

Q3. Suppose things work out so you could be as influential as you have ever hoped to be. Which is the highest of these levels of government at which you might succeed in getting elective officials to take action you think is important, by the time you are 45 years old.

N	%	
86 55 79 71	29.5 18.8 27.1 24.3	0. None of the above 1. City or county 2. State 3. National
	.3	9. Not ascertained
292	100.0	

Suppose things work out so that you are not very influential. Which is the lowest of these levels at which you are sure you could succeed in getting elective officials to take action you think is important, by the time you are 45 years old. Q4.

N	% `	
149 98 38 6	51.0 33.6 13.0 2.1	0. None of the above 1. City or county 2. State 3. National
_1	.3	9. Not ascertained
202	100.0	

Correlations of Political Influence Aspiration Scale and Other Selected Scales N=292^a

and the second s					ويري والمراجعة والاربع فيتحاجز والمحمسين ومحاركة فالحاري			· · · ·
M	SD	}	POL ASP	PINT	GTASP	POL EFF	PKNOW	
3.472	2.954	POL ASP	1.0					
2.700	.939	PINT	.217	1.0				Å
17.096	8.729	GTASP	.312	.090	1.0			
2.320	1.314	POL EFF	.206	.288	.015	1.0		
4.601	2.834	PKNOW	.300	• 353	.187	. 276	1.0	
								1.1

^aPol Asp = Total Political Aspirations; PINT = Political Interest; GTASP = Total Government Office Occupational Aspirations; POL EFF = Total Political Efficacy; PKNOW = Total Political Knowledge.

Inter-item and Item To Total Correlations for the Political Influence Aspiration Scale^a N=292^a

M	SD	POLASP1	POLASP2	POLASP3	POLASP4	TPOLASP
.9414	.963	POLASPIIS 1.0	333	741	543	
.4103	.600	POLASP2 (5 .533	1.0	472	598	· .
1.4639	1.154	POLASP3 JL 741	. 472	1.0	661	
.6598	. 782	POLASP4 RL.543	. 598	.661	1.0	
		TPOLASP .867	.720	.905	.833	1.0

Alpha Coefficient = .841

^aPOL ASP 1 = Political Aspirations Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); POL ASP 2 = Political Aspirations Question 2 (Realistic, Short Term); POL ASP 3 = Political Aspirations Question 3 (Idealistic, Long Term); POL ASP 4 = Political Aspirations Question 4 (Realistic, Long Term); TPOL ASP = Total Political Aspirations.

Factor and

Correlation Matrix for Income Aspiration Scale and Other Selected Scales^a

M	SD	۲	TINC ASP	THOUSE	TCAR	
84.723	32.324	TINC ASP	1.0			
17.096	8.729	THOUSE	.277	1.0	·	
7.369	1.396	TCAR	. 189	. 298	1.0	

^aTINC ASP = Total Income Aspirations; THOUSE = Total House Aspirations; TCAR = Total Car Aspirations.

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Inter-item and Item to Total Correlations for the Income Aspiration Scale N=292^a

м	SD	1	NC ASP1	INC ASP2	INC ASP3	INC ASP4	TINC ASP
19.8962	9.115	INC ASPIZS	1.0	252	(1)	513	
15.0276	7.570	INC ASP2 RS	.750	1.0	498	578	
28.0069	11.592	INC ASP3 IS	.616	. 498	1.0	714	. *
21.8213	10.324	INC ASP4 RS	.513	. 578	.764	1.0	
84.7228	32.324	TINC ASP	.836	.820	.878	.867	1.0

Alpha = .847

R test/retest = .237

^aINC ASP 1 = Income Aspirations Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); INC ASP 2 = Income Aspirations Question 2 (Realistic, Short Term); INC ASP 3 = Income Aspirations Question 3 (Idealistic, Long Term); INC ASP 4 = Income Aspirations Question 4 (Realistic, Long Term); TINC ASP = Total Income Aspirations.

Faith

Questions and Distributions of Responses for Significant Other Political Expectations

Q5.

Suppose thing worked out so that (he/she) could be as influential as (he/she) ever hoped to be. By the time (he/she) is 25 years old, what is the highest level of government at which (he/she) might get elected officials to take some action (he/she) thinks is important...

NA .	6	
49	32.9	0. None at all (Code 8 in col. 29)
63	42.3	1. City or county
26	17.4	2. State
3	2.0	3. National
7	4.7	7. No idea
1	.7	8. Inap, no to A
0	.0	9. Not ascertained
140	100.0	

Suppose things work out so (he/she) is not very influential by the age of 25. What is the lowest level of government at which you are sure (he/she) can get elected officials to take some action (he/she) thinks is important.

- 1 A	. 6	
13	8.7	0. None at all
73	49.0	1. City or county
2	1.3	2. State
0	.0	3. National
10	6.7	7. No idea
50	33.6	8. Inap, no to A, none to Q5
	.7	9. Not ascertained
149	100.0	

64

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۰,

Q6. Suppose things worked out so that (he/she) could be as influential as (he/she) ever hoped to be. By age 45, what is the highest level of government at which (he/she) might get elected officials to take some action (he/she) thinks is important.

	10	
39	26.2	0. None (Code 8 in col. 31)
30	20.1	1. City or county
44	29.5	2. State
26	17.4	3. National
8	5.4	7. No idea
1	.7	8. Inap, no to A
1	.7	9. Not ascertained
149	100.0	

Suppose things work out so that (he/she) is not very influential. By the age of 45, what is the lowest level of government at which you are sure (he/she) can get elected officials to take some action (he/she) thinks is important.

N	%	
8	5.4	0. None at all
74	49.7	1. City or county
15	10.1	2. State
3	2.0	3. National
8	5.4	7. No idea
40	26.8	8. Inap, no to A, none to Q6
<u>1</u>	.7	9. Not ascertained
149	100.0	

Q6a.

Political influence Expectation Levels for Youths; Significant Others (SO) X Significant Others, Item (Q) X Item, Time₁ (T) X Time₂ Correlations for Each Youth's First Three SO's

Digit] = Time 1XX-2XX Times | & 2 Digit 2 = SO X1X-X3X SOs 1, 2 & 3 Digit 3 = 0 XX1 - XX4 Questions 1, 2, 3 & 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 4 h 2 3 2 2 2 -08 -07 11 04 13 -11 01 -13 37 32 36 30 28 07 21 -03 111 -- 77 73 56 23 -11 12 -05 33 16 30 -02 77 -- 70 62 -03 -15 -01 -02 17 00 11 -10 31 35 46 - 41 15 - 15 10 - 14 112 15 -04 09 -13 113 73 70 -- 86 -21 -27 -17 -18 16 02 -01 -01 48 49 46 - 48 -15 -28 -15 -34 -25 -37 -25 -42 114 56 62 86 ---23 -30 -20 -20 04 14 11 17 42 41 40 47 16 01 08 -04 39 22 29 -08 03 -21 -23 -- 76 87 73 -29 -19 -16 -15 55 50 63 63 33 121 -04 -30 11 06 75 -24 -22 -33 -32 49 65 54 65 33 42 35 48 -07 -15 -27 -30 - 81 10 -04 15 20 122 76 --26 20 87 75 -- 80 -33 -22 -16 -19 56 48 77 67 34 16 123 11 -01 -17 -20 02 -31 11 07 124 04 -02 -18 -20 73 81 80 --10 - 20 20 16 -26 -24 -22 -32 28 27 21 46 60 66 71 38 -- 75 78 76 29 03 52 16. 131 -23 -17 -16 04 -04 10 02 10 -12 -14 -32 -27 -29 -14 -19 -23 132 -11 00 02 14 -30 -04 -31 -20 75 -- 63 66 -12 -30 -35 -42 -40 -20 -38 -28 22 11 39 19 133 01 11 -01 11 11 15 11 20 78 64 -- 81 -13 -23 -23 -16 -19 -03 -11 -08 57 39 79 47 134 -13 -10 -01 17 06 20 07 16 76 66 61 ---26 -37 -30 -32 -14 05 -16 -06 55 48 66 59 37 31 48 42 211 -29 -24 -33 -26 -12 -12 -13 -26 -- 68 74 55 01 -06 -11 -22 -04 -08 -09 -23 35 -14 -30 -23 -37 68 --212 49 41 -19 -22 -22 -24 66 76 1 32 -09 07 01 -08 05 -02 -05 -13 40 213 36 46 46 -16 -33 -16 -22 -32 -35 -23 -38 74 66 -- 82 -17 -25 04 -19 02 -04 -07 -32 214 30 41 48 47 -15 -32 -19 -32 -27 -42 -16 -32 55 76 82 ---19 -19 -05 -23 06 -03 06 -17 221 23 15 -15 -25 55 49 56 46 -29 -40 -19 -14 01 -09 -17 -19 -- 57 70 57 01 01 -02 -01 222 -11 -15 -28 -37 65 48 -14 -20 -03 05 50 60 -06 07 -25 -19 57 -- 57 - 30 31 38 22 32 223 12 10 -15 -25 -19 -38 -11 -16 63 54 77 66 -10 01 04 -05 70 57 -- 73 15 04 11 -06 -05 -14 -34 -42 63 65 67 224 71 -23 -28 -08 -06 -22 -08 -19 -23 57~80 78 21 09 21 . . 13 231 23 33 15 16 33 33 34 38 29 22 59 55 -04 05 02 06 👫 01 31 15 13 --: 82 79 71 07 16 -04 01 232 39 42 26 28 03 11 39 48 -08 -02 -04 -03 01 38 04 21 82 -- 60 84 233 30 09 08 21 22 35 20 27 52 39 79 66 -09 -05 -07 06 -02 22 11 09 79 60 -- 67 ₿ 16⁻ 19 47 59 234 -03 -02 -13 -04 29 48 16 21 -23 -13 -32 -17 -01 32 -06 21 71 84 67 --

TABLE 7

Inter-item Correlations for Political Expectation Scale $$N=33^a$$

Winnhe & Number & Significit othes

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• •	TSOQ1P	TSOQ2P	TSOU3P	TSOQ4P	TSOPEX
TSOQIP	1.0	,			
TS0Q2P	.655	1.0			
TS003P	.851	.661	1.0		
TSOQ4P	.665	.679	.790	1.0	
TSOPEX	.906	. 798	• 955	.895	1.0

R test retest = .754

^aTSOQIP = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); TSOQ2P = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 2 (Realistic, Short Term); TSOQ3P = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 3 (Idealistic, Long Term); TSOQ4P = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 4 (Realistic, Long Term); TSOPEX = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4).

Correlations of Youth's Political Aspirations With Significant Others' Political Expectations^a

	POL EXP1	POL EXP2	POL EXP3	POL EXP4	TOTAL POL EXP
POL ASPI	.04	.20	.10	01	.15
POL ASP2	. 27	•39	.39	.27	.42
POL ASP3	~.13	.03	~.08	26	09
POL ASP4	.05	.07	.18	02	.15
TOTAL POL ASP	.03	.17	.13	06	.13

^aPOL EXP1 = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); POL EXP2 = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 2 (Realistic, Short Term); POL EXP3 = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 3 (Idealistic, Long Term); POL EXP4 = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 4 (Realistic, Short Term); Total POL EXP = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4); POL ASP1 = Youth's Political Aspirations Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); POL ASP 2 = Youth's Political Aspirations Question 2; POL ASP3 = Youth's Political Aspirations Question 3; POL ASP4 = Youth's Political Aspirations Question 3; POL ASP4 = Youth's Political Aspirations Question 4; TOTAL POL ASP = Total Political Aspirations (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4).

2

Income Expectations Levels for Youths Significant Other (SO) X Significant Other, Item (Q) X Item, Time 1 (T) X Time 2 Correlations for each Youth's First 3 SO's

Digit I = T | XX - 2XX Time | & 2Digit $2 = 50 \times 1X - \times 3X \times 50 = 1, 2, 3$ Digit 3 = 0 XXI-XX4 Questions 1-4 h h - 26 10 02 -06 -----02 - 09 - 34 10 09 36 32 -19 75 63 27 33 62 79 71 25 26 -18 29 12 13 12 29 45 50 16 25 18 -01 -12 02 -02 ---33 26 39 38 55 H : 29 -----01 -04 -09 -13 -54 -13 -09 ----36 53 76 61 ----36 36 29 10 50 31 -24 18 10 - 28 22 58 54 70 52 27 25 26 63 77 82 35 24 12 31 32 --19 11 76 42 58 11 10 02 -06 32 46 .62 01 -04 -09 -13 49 76 -44 -59' 23 33 -34 --10 -09 004 -00 68 42 75 21 16 10 09 36 36 29 10 41 35 62 76 76 28 25 18 12 34 -01 78 33 72 61 29 29 12 13 24 12 . ---82 62 47 48 39 38 34 19 26 47 23 62 56 71 - 28 --44 39 ----78 - 19 48 44 50 57 - 41 -69 33 39 45 31 32 28 10 28 25 18 12 62 78 ----29 08 -59 12 29 -50 57 78 29 51 14 25 19 29 07 55 11 54 29 19 11 24 18 -47 ------47 11 15 13 -02 -54 37 27 Ъb 50 31 - 64 10 -09 04 -00 --36 53 18 -01 22 58 54 70 34 -01 28 27 47 86 25 54 16 25 -48 24 48 18 17 76 42 58 50 14 29 32 14 62 56 71 72 51 14 -- 96 79 83 03 18 45 75 59 - 13 ---19 31 30 19 <u>32</u> 24 42 75 66 ---12 02 09 -02 27 52 27 1/ 78 33 72 61 33 39 45 - 59 25 54 20 48 83 85 89

TAB

Inter-item Correlation For Income Expectation Scale $(N=22)^a$

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2 3

	TSOIQI	TS01Q2	TSOLU3	TS0104	TSOIEX	
TSOLOI	1.0	•				
TS01Q2	. 721	1.0				
TS01-03	.751	.692	1.0		·	
TSO1Q4	.756	.897	.773	1.0		
TSOIEX	.912	. 872	.930	.926	1.0	

R test pretest = .699

Correlations of Youths' Income Aspirations With Significant Others' Income Expectations^a

· ·	•		j	• •	• • • •
	I EXP1	I EXP2	I EXP3	I EXP4	TOTAL I EXP
I ASP1	02	10	.07	. 04	.03
I ASP2	02	18	.03	04	07
I ASP3	- 15	- 25	02	09	15
I ASP4	04	11	. 09	. 02	04
TOTAL I ASP	06	17	.04	02	06

Income Aspiration (family) 1, 2, 3, 4, and total Total SO's Expectation Income QI, Q2, Q3, Q4 and total

Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlation for Major Variables^a N=56

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	X	<u>S.D.</u>		TSOPEX	<u>TSPS</u>	TPOLASP	<u>SEX</u>	<u>GPA</u>	RESID	POLEFF	POLINT	TPOCK	COLPLAN	TSOIEX	TIASE
	3.57	1.52	TSOPEX	1.0											
	0.76	0.55	TSPS	.461	1.0										· .
	3.73	3.02	TPOLASP	.135	.008	1.0	· ·		· · · ·						-
	0.61	0.49	SEX	422	364	231	1.0							•	
7	2.51	0.66	GPA	.103	066	.011	.402	1.0							
•	0.14	0.35	RESID	.209	240	.105	.015	187	1.0					a series a	
	2.36	1.31	POLEFF			045	068	.307	.004	1.0	ł	_			
	2.55	0.91	POLINT	.276	.115	. 180	195	013	137	.321	1.0				
	4.64	2.72	TPOCK			.211	170	004	134	.112	.538	1.0			
	0.44	0.50	COLPLAN	.303	071	.316	063	. 140	051	.192	290	. 144	1.0		
	77.70	19.70	TSOIEX	.279	. 101	.204	- 153	(.456)	008	**************************************	.060	day was take upo day	.240	1.0	
	84.79	34.27	TIASP	.227	(.32)	.134	.001	042	131	189	.211	022	.194	063	1.0
												,	}		

^aTSOPEX = Total Significant Others Political Expectations; TSPS = Total Significant Others Political Status; TPOLASP = Total Political Aspirations; SEX = 1 for Females, 0 for Males; GPA = High School Grade Point Average; RESID = Farm/Non-Farm Residence; POLEFF = Political Efficacy; POLINT = Political Interest; TPOCK = Political Knowledge; COLPLAN = College Plans; TSOIEX = Total Significant Others Income Expectations; TIASP = Total Income Aspirations.

			· · ·				•		IA	hate	the	
. *	· .			TAB	LE 14				· / /	Inne	le).	9
Relat	Sta ionshi	ndard p of 1 To Ba	ized Re Fotal S ackgrou	gressio ignific nd and	n Coefi ant Oth Individ	ficient ners Po dual Va	s Descr litical riables	ibing Expect a	tations	j/m	contry	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	. ·	• •
TSPS	.461	. 460	.436	.354	.360	.470	.327	.331	.542	. 485		
TPOLASP		.131	.094		. 069			. 034				
POLINT			.209	. "	, ,							-
SEX		•		293	275		421	410				
GPA						.134	. 294	.289			÷	
RESIP	·								.339			
COLPLAN	·.									.337		
(c) [?] :	2.609	2.365	1.599	3.380	3.205	1.816	1.977	1.911	2.230	2.114		
Ē ²	.198	.201	.229	.260	.251	.201	.322	.310	. 295	.300		
Standard Error of Esti-						•				· .		
mate	1.359	1.356	1.332	1.305	1.313	1.356	1.249	1.260	1.273	1.269		

Star	ndardized	Regression C	oefficients	Describ	oing Relatio	onship of
「otal	Political	Aspirations	To Backgrou	Ind and	Individual	Variables ^a

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SEX	-,296	327		397
GPA	.156	.177		.317
RESIDD	.139	.154		.251
TSOPEX		053		180
POLEFF			104	252
POLINT			.132	.226
TPOLK	· ·		.152	.085
C	2.869	3.105	2.405	1.563
₹	.032	.015	.006	.046
Standard Error of	2 970	2 996	3 009	2 0/3
Latimate	2.370	2.330	5.009	2.340

Standardized Regression Coefficients Describing Relationship of Total Significant Others Income Expectations To Background and Individual Variables^a

	(1)
SEX	~.395
GPA	.618
RESID	.120
COLPLAN	.135
	· .
C	37.570
\bar{R}^2	.325
Standard Error of Estimate	16.189

Standardized Regression Coefficients Describing Relationship of Total Income Aspirations To Background and Individual Variables^a

	(1)	(2)
SEX	.067	.037
GPA	125	079
RESID	145	136
COLPLAN	- 208	.218
TSOIEX		075
C	94.107	99.010
\bar{R}^2	009	025
Standard Error of Estimate	34.417	34.694

TABLE 17

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