The Measurement of Political and Income Aspirations and Expectations

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ABSTRACT

The importance of certain social psychological isomorphs of stratification--aspirations and expectations--in the status attainment process have been recognized for many years. Such variables have proven to have important consequences for the status attainment process, particularly in the areas of educational and occupational status attainment. Classical theorists of status differentiation conceived of status hierarchies as multidimensional, not only including education and occupation but also income and political statuses. Yet, to date the social psychological isomorphs of income and political status attainment have remained largely undeveloped. Actually, the political status dimension of stratification, also ~~remains largely~~ too, has yet to be measured by unmeasured, although other papers present efforts to provide such an instrument. The present paper presents scales developed to measure income and political aspirations and expectations. The reliability and validity of these scales and their usefulness in further research is discussed.

I. Introduction

A. Previous Research

In this paper we report on the results of a research project designed to measure the social psychological isomorphs of achieved economic and political adult statuses. This project, guided by the social psychologically oriented status attainment research tradition (see, for example, Haller and Woelfel, 1972; Haller, Woelfel, and Fink, 1969; and Sewell, Haller, and Ohlendorf, 1970), has centered upon assessing the economic and political aspirations of a youth and these same expectations of him by an elicited significant other.

Portes and Haller (1973), in a ~~recent~~ appraisal of status attainment research, pointed out that while a great deal was known about the role of educational and occupational aspirations and expectations in the process of status attainment, there were no instruments currently available by which to measure any of the status isomorphs for either income or political influence (see, Olson and Bills, 1978, for a recent attempt to measure political influence status). Yet classical stratification theorists (for example, Weber, 1946; Sorokin, 1927; and Svalastoga, 1965, held ~~wealth~~ (income) and political statuses to be equally if not more important than educational or occupational statuses. Recently economic (income) status had been the target of considerable research. (See, for example, Jencks, et. al., 1972). The political dimension of stratification has remained a relatively untouched area[1] both in terms of its study as a hierarchical status dimension and in terms of its social psychological isomorphs.

Our purpose in this paper is to provide a description of efforts to measure the social psychological isomorphs of income and political status for

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1. See Archibald O. Haller and Helcio U. Saraiva, "Status Measurement and the Variable Discrimination Hypothesis in an Isolated Brazilian Region." Rural Sociology 37 (September) for an attempt to measure a political dimension of stratification systems in Brazil.

inclusion in status attainment models. While we feel it inappropriate to present our analyses at this point as formal tests of substantive theories, we do hope that our analyses provide an informative base upon which to build further work. We will try to stress our mistakes as well as our insights, on the premise that being wrong can at least be instructive.

B. Aspirations, expectations, and Status Attainment

The concept of aspiration refers to a special type of attitude. The object of aspirations is the attainment of adult statuses, which vary in their degree of difficulty to achieve. As Haller, et al., note, "An aspiration is a social psychological variable...which is a part of a person's cognitive structure...and takes its hierarchical form from a social structural phenomena, a status hierarchy." (1974)

A person's aspiration is a limited range of points on a status hierarchy which he views as either desirable or attainable for himself. Aspirations consist of a youth's conception of a limited range of statuses which have as an upper bound those statuses which are within a range of feasibility for him and as a lower bound those statuses that would be at a minimum acceptable ~~to him~~. Aspirational research measures the level of a youth's aspirations in terms of realistic and idealistic goals. In addition, it is concerned with changes in the bounds of these two goal regions over time.

The concept of significant others was introduced by Harry Stack Sullivan (1940). The term is meant to refer to those individuals who exert major influence on the social self of the individual. The significant other's expectations for an individual refer to the predictions and anticipations that the significant other holds for the individual. They are a type of interpersonal influence in that they convey to the youth behavior which would be appropriate for him in the future.

Within the framework of status attainment research, significant others have been thought capable of exercising two distinct kinds of influence. First, they can act as definers for the individual by actually conveying information to him concerning what his future attainment levels should be. Second, they may serve as models for the youth by which he may pattern his own behavior. In addition, they may serve either of these roles by defining or modeling behavior which would (1) be appropriate for the youth in the future (significant others for self) or (2) they may serve as definers or models for the status area itself (significant others for the object status).

The status areas which serve as objects for aspirations and expectations are thought of as hierarchical distributions which rank individuals adult attainments in several areas. These areas include years of education completed, occupational prestige, annual income, and political influence (See for example, Portes and Haller, 1970).

In status attainment research, the relationship between attitudes (aspirations and expectations) and behavior (later adult statuses) has been conceived of as one of mediation where attitudes mediate the relationship between measured background and adult achievements. The literature consistently demonstrates that youth's own aspirations and significant other's expectations have strong direct effects on adult behavior. (See, for example, Sewell, Haller, and Portes, 1969; and Sewell, Haller and Ohlendorf, 1970)

In this project, instruments were developed by which to measure youth's aspirations for and their significant others' expectations for the youth's future levels of income and political influence. This paper will summarize the reliability and validity of those instruments. Figure 1 identifies the status variables used in creating those variables described in the

present paper.

II. Sample Description

Data for the present study were collected by the research team in the spring of 1976. The present study is based on questionnaires administered to 292 members of the Junior Class of Chippewa Falls High School. Chippewa Falls is located in a rural Wisconsin county and was specifically selected as a test site for the research on the basis of the presumed high level of political activity of individuals in this area. An important reason for this presumption was that the Wisconsin Farmer's Union has its headquarters there

III. The Political Aspiration Scale

A. Description of the scale.

The Political Influence Aspiration Scale is a four item scale which measures youth's aspirations for future political influence at local, state, and federal levels of government. The four questions cover two dimensions of aspirations which are Idealistic (I)/ Realistic (R), and Short Term (ST)/ Long Term (LT). Question one addresses Idealistic, Short Term (IST) political influence aspirations. Question two addresses Realistic, Short Term (RST) political influence aspirations. Question three addresses Idealistic, Long Term (ILT) political influence aspirations. Question four addresses Realistic, Long Term (RLT) political influence aspirations.

B. Scoring of the Scale.

Possible scores on each item range from 0-3 with 0 = no influence aspirations, 1 = local influence aspirations, 2 = state influence aspirations, 3 = federal influence aspirations. The political influence aspiration scale is a simple summation of the scores on each of the four items.

Table 1 presents the distribution of responses to the items on the Political Aspiration Scale. The first question, that dealing with short term idealistic influence, reveals that 30.8% of youth limit their aspirations to the local level, and that 41.1% have no political aspirations whatsoever. Less than 8% of the sample feels that, in the best of all possible worlds, they will exercise federal influence by the time they are 25.

When these same youth are asked for their realistic short-term political aspirations, the question essentially reduces to a dichotomy. Either a youth intends not to participate at all, or is only confident in his ability to be locally influential. Only nine respondents expressed the belief that state or federal influence was a realistic aspiration by age 25.

The pattern of responses to the long-term idealistic question is markedly different from that of the short-term idealistic question. While over a quarter of the sample still shows no interest in future political activity, we now find a sizable proportion who believe that they can conceivably exert state influence (27.1%), and a large proportion who ideally aspire toward being influential federally (24.3%). When we turn to long-term realistic, we find that over half the sample (51.0%) expect no influence and 33.6% expect only local influence. Further, we find that 13.0% of the sample considers state influence to be a realistic aspiration when they are 45 years of age, and six respondents state that they will be federally influential at this stage of life.

C. Validity.

Two types of validity evidence are available. The first is an internal evidence of validity. As Haller and Miller (1971) note, "General level of aspiration theory and research holds that, on the average, level of aspiration at the idealistic level is higher than level of aspiration at the realis-

tic level, and similarly that level of aspiration in terms of long-range goals is higher than level of aspiration in terms of short-range goals." Given this fact, we would predict that $\overline{X}$ RST < $\overline{X}$ ILT and $\overline{X}$ RLT < $\overline{X}$ ILT. As we see in the first panel of Figure 2 these relations hold. Further, we would expect: $\overline{X}$ RST < $\overline{X}$ RLT and $\overline{X}$ IST < $\overline{X}$ ILT. We see in Figure 2 that this is also the case. We take this as evidence of the internal validity of the Political Aspiration Scale.

The second type of validity evidence is construct validity evidence. Construct validity refers to the process of evaluating a construct by empirical tests of predictions concerning its behavior in relation to that of other variables. Several scales have been used as construct validity tests for the Political Aspiration Scale. These include a Government Office Aspiration Scale which was constructed especially for this study. The scale questions youth about their desire to hold various government jobs in the future. The scale is constructed analogously to the Occupational Aspiration Scale (see Haller and Miller, 1971). The alpha coefficient for this scale is .622. Also included is a standard 5 item political efficacy scale with an alpha coefficient of .412, a political interest variable, and a nine item political knowledge scale (described in Olson,(1977)), with an alpha coefficient of .813.

If the Political Aspiration Scale is a valid instrument we would predict a positive relationship between the Political Influence Aspiration Scale and each of the other measures. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations among these scales. As is evidenced in Table 2 the predicted positive relationships between the Political Aspiration Scale and each of the other above mentioned scales hold. We take this as evidence supporting the construct validity of the Political Influence

Aspiration Scale.

D. Reliability.

Two measures of reliability are available for the Political Influence Aspiration Scale. The first is the alpha coefficient which measures the internal consistency of the scale. Table 3 presents the inter-item and item-to-total correlations for the Political Influence Aspiration Scale. The alpha coefficient for the scale is .841. We believe that this shows the Political Aspiration Scale to have high reliability. The second measure of reliability is the test-retest coefficient which measures stability of the scale across time. The test/retest coefficient for the political aspiration scale is .328. This low coefficient calls into question the stability, thus the reliability of the scale.

IV. The Income Aspiration Scale

A. Description of the Scale.

The Income Aspiration Scale is a four item scale which measures students' aspirations for future personal income. The four questions cover two dimensions of aspirations which are Idealistic (I)/ Realistic (R), and Short Term (ST)/ Long Term (LT). Question one addresses Idealistic Short Term (IST) personal income aspirations. Question two addresses Realistic Short Term (RST) personal income aspirations. Question three addresses Idealistic Long Term (ILT) personal income aspirations, and question four addresses Realistic Long Term (RLT) personal income aspirations.

B. Scoring of the Scale.

Possible scores on each item range from 00-50. The scores refer to income aspirations ranging from $00 to $50,000. The Income Aspiration Scale is a simple summation of the scores on each of the four items. (Table 4 presents the inter-item and item-to-total score correlations for the Income

Aspiration Scale.)

C. Validity.

Two types of validity evidence are available. The first is an internal evidence of validity. (See note under validity for Political Influence Aspirations Scale.) We would predict that $\overline{X}$RST < $\overline{X}$IST and $\overline{X}$RLT < $\overline{X}$ILT. As we see in the second panel of Figure 2, these relationships hold. Further, we would expect that $\overline{X}$RST < $\overline{X}$RLT and $\overline{X}$IST < $\overline{X}$ILT. We see in Figure 2 that this is also the case. We take this as evidence of the internal validity of the Income Aspiration Scale.

The second type of validity evidence that is available is construct validity. (See note under Political Influence Aspirations Scale, validity.) Two scales have been used as construct validity tests for the income aspiration scale. These are first, a House Aspiration Scale. The scale asks youth to identify the price of house they would like to own in the future. It is a four item scale. The four questions cover two dimensions of aspirations which are Idealistic, Realistic, and Short Term, Long Term. Question one addressed Idealistic, Short Term (IST) house ownership aspirations. Question two addresses Realistic, Short Term (RST) house ownership aspirations. Question three addresses Idealistic, Long Term (ILT) house ownership aspirations. Question four addresses Realistic, Long Term (RLT) house ownership aspirations. Possible scores on each item range from 01-15 with 01 = 10,000 to 15 = 50,000. The House Aspiration Scale is a simple summation of the scores on each of the four items. The alpha coefficient for the scale is .836.

The second scale is the Car Aspiration Scale which asks youths to identify the type of car they would like to own in the future. It is a four-item scale. The four questions cover two dimensions of aspirations which are Idealistic, Realistic, and Short Term, Long Term. Question one addresses

Idealistic, Short Term (IST) car ownership aspirations. Question two addresses Realistic, Short Term (RST) car ownership aspirations. Question three addresses Idealistic Long Term (ILT) car ownership aspirations. Question four addresses Realistic, Long Term (RLT) car ownership aspirations. Possible scores on the items range from 1-3 with 1 = economy car, 2 = mid-sized car, 3 = luxury car. The Car Aspiration Scale is a simple summation of the four items. The alpha coefficient for the Car Aspiration Scale is .364.

If the Income Aspiration Scale is a valid measure we would predict a positive relationship between the Income Aspiration Scale and the Car and House Aspiration Scales. Table 5 presents the means, standard deviations, and the zero-order correlations among these scales. We note in Table 5 that there are positive but small relationships between the Income Aspirations measure and the other two aspirations measures. The evidence for or against the Income Aspiration Scale, however, must take into account the unreliability of the Car Aspiration Measure as evidenced by its alpha coefficient. Overall we hold that the relationship between the Income Aspiration Scale and the House and Car Aspiration Scales provide some evidence for the construct validity of the Income Aspiration Scale.

D. Reliability.

Two measures of reliability are available for the Income Aspiration Scale. The first is the alpha coefficient which measures the internal consistency of the scale. Table 4 presents the inter-item and item-to-total correlations for the Income Aspiration Scale. The alpha coefficient for the Income Aspiration Scale is .87. We believe that this shows the Income Aspiration Scale to have high reliability. The second measure of reliability is the test/retest coefficient which measures stability of the scale across time.

The test/retest coefficient for the Income Aspiration Scale is .060. This extremely low coefficient calls into question the stability, thus the reliability of the scale.

E. Conclusion.

On the basis of these findings we can say that both the Income Aspiration Scale and the Political Aspiration Scale have face validity and somewhat less adequate construct validity. In addition, the alpha coefficients are very high showing evidence of the promising reliability of the scales. However, the stability of the measures is very low. This would lead one to believe that while at any particular measurement application, youth can answer these questions in an interpretable manner, across time, their answers change. Given that reliability sets an upper limit on validity, the usage of these scales on high school youth is called into question.

V. Significant Other Elicitor: Political and Income Forms

A. Description of Instruments

Concurrent with the administration of the Income and Political Influence Aspiration Scales, the 292 youth were asked to identify the names of those people who had aided them in the formation of their political and income aspirations. Figure 3 illustrates the framework by which the Significant Other Elicitor, Political Form was developed. The Significant Other Elicitor, Income Form was developed in an analogous fashion.

B. Sample

Owing to financial constraints, the analysis of Significant Other's expectations was limited to a sample of 59 randomly selected youth of which 56 finally presented usable data. For each of these 56 youth a maximum of three individuals were contacted. These significant others were asked about their

expectations for the youth's future income and political statuses.

All Significant Others identified were considered to be both political and income significant others, regardless of whether or not they were explicitly named as such by the youth. Therefore, in many cases individuals were used as significant others for a given respondent whether or not the youth named that individual as a significant other for a particular status area. This conceivably represents a considerable problem, but the restricted sample size necessitated this procedure. The problem results since 21% of the youth name no political significant others and 47% of the youth have no overlap between political and income significant others. Previous research has suggested a considerable overlap between educational and occupational significant others, which led us to perform a similar operation here. The above results expose this practice to be far less justifiable in the case of income and political significant others. However, given the restricted sample size, this procedure was retained, even acknowledging that this possibly results in severe methodological and ultimately substantive difficulties.

VI. The Political Expectation Scale

A. Description of the Scale.

The Political Expectation Scale was designed to be isomorphic with the previously described Political Aspiration Scale, with the only difference being that SO's are here asked to specify their political expectations for the youths who have named them as their SO's. The scoring too is similar, except that the average of any given youth's SO's expectations was used to correct for the fact that not all youths have the same number of SO's.

Table 6 presents the distribution of responses to the items on the Political Expectations Scale. Comparing these with Table 1, we find that, in

general, Significant Others tend to expect more from youth than the youth do from themselves. SO's are both less likely than youths to state that a youth will exercise no influence at all, and more likely to state that the youth will be influential at high levels. Whether the apparent optimism and encouragement of the SO's or the apparent skepticism and disinterest of the youth's is more realistic is of course an empirical question, yet these tables do seem to indicate that expectations seem to be higher than aspirations.

B. Reliability of Individual Significant Other Political Scales.

Table 7 consists of 21 unique correlation matrices. The coding schemes found along the rows and columns consists of three numbers. The first pertains to time, with "1" corresponding to the initial testing instrument and "2" corresponding to the retest. The second number indicates whether we are dealing with the first, second, or third SO. The third number refers to one of four questionnaire items. Thus, each of the top three matrices along the main diagonal contains inter-item correlations for a given SO at Time 1, while the bottom three matrices present this information for the retest. The other three matrices denoted with the bold lines present test-retest inter-item correlations, holding constant the designation of the SO. Thus, these three matrices contain estimates of stability. Six cells present intra-class correlations among SO expectations at Time 1 (cells numbered 21, 31, 32) and Time 2 (cells numbered 54, 64, 65). The remaining six matrices contain correlations that are cross-time and cross-SO, and are somewhat less substantively interpretable.

In interpreting the table, it is important to note that since not all youths have the same number of significant others, SO1 >SO2 >SO3. Thus, we would expect the estimates in the first cell along the main diagonal to be more reliable than those in the second cell, which would in turn be more reliable than those in the third matrix, with a similar pattern holding for the

bottom three matrices. The same reasoning can be applied elsewhere in the table.

The main diagonal of matrices in Table 7 would seem to indicate extremely good inter-item correlations for Significant Others Political Expectations, as these numbers range anywhere from .56 to .86. We believe that these numbers are indicative of the validity of the scale.

Our estimates of test-retest inter-item correlations are less encouraging. While eight of these twelve correlations are in the range of .46 to .79, which would seem to be acceptable, we also obtain four estimates below .40, including one as low as .11. These results again suggest the exercise of caution in using the Political Expectation Scale.

For the most part, our estimates of intra-class correlations are fairly distressing. We find that individuals named as significant others by the youths are in little agreement among themselves as to the youth's political promise. Well over half of the entries in these six cells are negative, and even the largest estimates indicate little consensus among significant others expectations. Basically, we find a vast difference in what designated significant others expect from youth.

C. Reliability and Validity of Total Significant Other Political Expectation Scale.

The third panel of Figure 2 displays a pattern of means which points to the internal validity of the scale. All predicated relations hold.

Table 8 presents the inter-item and item-to-total correlations for the Political Expectation Scale. The Alpha coefficient for the Political Expectation Scale is .89, and the test-retest is .784. We believe that this indicates a reliable scale.

D. Correlation of Political Aspirations and Political Expectations.

Table 9 shows the correlations of the Political Aspiration questions

with the corresponding Political Expectation questions. Since the entries along the main diagonal represent the correlations of similar concepts asked of the youths and their SO's (for example, short term idealistic), we might expect these correlations to be the highest in the table. We do not, however, find this to be the case, and in fact the correlation between the two scales overall is only .13.

The only apparent pattern in the table is the relatively large size of the correlations in Row 2, those pertaining to realistic, short-term political aspirations. This item might, prima facie, be considered the most reliable, or at least the most believable, of these eight questions, but even these correlations are modest.

While these results may call into question the validity of these two scales, they may also be accurately reflecting the real world. High school youths may easily have extremely unclear and not fully crystalized conceptions of their future places in the political realm. Perhaps most have seldom, if ever, even considered these issues. Further, it is possible that the significant others do not find their conceptions of youth's political potential to be particularly salient to their lives. Finally, even if the "true" correlation between aspirations and expectations is much higher than the observed correlation of .13, any errors in the elicitation and identification of significant others could serve to attenuate the observed correlation.

E. Conclusion.

In sum, the Political Expectations Scale seems to be both valid and reliable. Unfortunately, we are here unable to assess the construct validity of the scale as we did with the Political Aspirations Scale, since the appropriate validating constructs are not available. We thus base our assess-

ment of the scale on the alpha coefficient, a test-retest coefficient, and the information contained in Figure 5.

VII. The Income Expectation Scale

A. Description of the Scale.

Again, this scale is analogous to the Income Aspiration Scale, except that it is asked of the elicated significant other rather than the youths.

B. Reliability of Individual Significant Others Income Expectations.

Table 10 contains data on Significant Others Income Expectations, and is constructed in the same way as Table 7. In general, the entries along the main diagonal of matrices represent satisfactory inter-item correlations. The large size of the entries in the final cell may be a bit puzzling, but it should be remembered that these estimates are based on a very limited sample size (n=22).

The estimates of test-retest inter-item correlations are also reasonable. Following the main diagonal of the appropriate three matrices (since the off-diagonal entries are cross-item, cross-time, and not as substantively interesting or informative), we observe stability estimates which average (unweighted by number of significant others) about .57. While not overwhelming, this does indicate that significant others answer fairly consistently across time.

Finally, we turn to our estimates of intra-class correlations. Once again we find considerable diversity within any given cell, and are hard pressed to discern any clear patterns.

C. Reliability and Validity of Total Significant Others Income Expectations Scale.

The fourth panel of Figure 2 indicates a predictable and consistent pattern of means for realistic and idealistic short term and long term expectations.

Table 11 presents the inter-item and item-to-total correlations for the Total Significant Other Income Expectation Scale. The Alpha coefficient for the scale is .883,and the test-retest is .590. We interpret these as being extremely promising.

D. Correlations Between Income Aspirations and Income Expectations.

With very few exceptions, Table 12 consists of entries which are virtually indistinguishable from zero. Both the cross-respondent inter-item correlations and the item-to-total correlations suggest that there is little apparent correspondence between the economic success that a youth hopes to attain and the economic success expected from him by his SO's. In fact, seven of the 25 correlations in the table are negative, again raising some skepticism regarding the validity of our scales.

Here again, though, as in the case of political aspirations and expectations, we would suggest that neither youth nor significant others necessarily have well crystallized attitudes regarding future earnings potential. We would argue that the observed correlation of .04 may reflect the true state of affairs at the time of measurement, but that this correlation may easily increase over time.

E. Conclusion.

As in the case of the Political Expectation Scale, we can perform no tests of construct validity, but on the basis of the evidence at hand, we conclude that the Income Aspiration Scale is an apparently valid and reliable instrument.

VIII. Regression Analysis

A. Introduction.

In this section we present the results of a regression analysis de-

signed to assess the determinants of income and political aspirations and expectations. The results presented here should be considered both tentative and exploratory. First of all, we are dealing with only 56 cases, which limits both the number of independent variables we may employ in any given equation, and the confidence we may put in any of our estimates. Further, as noted above, the reliability of many of our variables is less than optimal,[2] and this too tempers our confidence in the estimates we report. We thus consider this section to be both a check on the validity of our instruments and concepts and an analysis of substantive questions.

B. Variables.

The variables to be used in this section are described as follows:

VARIABLES

High School Grade Point Average (GPA)

This is the school-reported average of the student's course work.

Sex (SEX)

This is coded "1" for females and "0" for males.

College Plans (COLPLAN)

This is coded as a dummy variable, with students planning on attending post-secondary institutions awarding transferable credits receiving a "1" and all others, including those planning on attending vocational schools, receiving a "0".

Residence (RESID)

Students living in rural areas, i.e., on a farm, were assigned a "1". All others were given a "0".

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[2] Given the preliminary nature of the analysis, we have made no effort to correct for unreliability in the independent variables.

Political Interest (POLINT)

This is a single item indicator which assesses the respondent's interest in political affairs. Possible scores on the item range from 1 to 4.

Political Knowledge (TPOLK)

This measure was developed by project personnel and reported in Olson (1977), and is intended to measure the person's ability to identify offices in the current political structure. It consists of a nine-item scale containing questions about all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) asked concerning all three levels of government (local, state, and federal). In each question, we asked respondents to identify the office with the most authority in that particular branch of government at a particular governmental level. As an example of this type of question, we asked:

> Which of these offices has the most authority in legislative matters on the federal level? Would it be U.S. Senator, U.S. Secretary of Defense, or Attorney General?

Total scores on the scale range from 0 to 9, with high values indicating a greater number of correct answers.

Sense of Political Efficacy (POLEFF)

This is a five-item, close-ended scale with possible scores ranging from 0 to 5. High values correspond to a high sense of person effectiveness in regards to politics. For an extensive review of the concept of political efficacy, see Prewitt, 1968, pp. 225-228.

Socioeconomic Background

Student's background was measured as the occupational status of their fathers, as measured by the Duncan index (FOCC), and their father's level of educational attainment in years of schooling (FED).

Significant Others Political Status (TSPS)

Significant Others Political Status is an average of Significant Others own political influence at local, state and federal levels of government (See Olson (1977), for a discussion of this variable).

The questions are analogous to those used to elicit political expectations and aspirations.

Significant Others Income (TSOINC)

This measured the average income level of the respondent's significant others.

Expectations and Aspirations

The four dependent variables in the following analyses are political and income expectations and aspirations, as defined earlier in the paper.

Table 13 presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for the above variables. Table 14 presents the results of equations in which the dependent variable is Significant Others Political Expectations. The most consistently striking feature of these equations is the extent to which a youth's SO seems to base their expectations for the youth on their own political status. While our small sample size forces us to examine only very parsimonious equations, this result holds even when additional variables are controlled.

Other characteristics of the youth also influence significant others' expectations. Not surprisingly, more is expected from boys, students who plan on continuing their education, and students with more highly educated fathers. Somewhat less predictably, significant others have higher expectations for rural youth, while father's occupation has little impact. Still, the most interesting result from this table is that SO expectations are conditioned mainly by the SO's own status, and only secondarily by

measured characteristics of the youth. More politically successful SO's simply seem to expect more political success from youth. Likewise less politically successful SO's expect less political success from youth.

In Table 15 we attempt to explain the youth's political aspirations and are, in general, fairly unsuccessful. Students with higher educational aspirations seem to have marginally higher political aspirations, and boys have somewhat higher political aspirations than do girls. Neither sense of political efficacy, political interest, nor political knowledge does much to increase one's aspirations. While the presence of unreliability in the measurement of these social psychological variables means that their effects are probably being underestimated to some degree, it should be noted that none of these variables even approach statistical, yet alone substantive, significant.

In Table 16 we present equations pertaining to Significant Others' Income Expectations. For all practical purposes, equations 3 and 4 tell the whole story. So's expect more from boys, and from high achieving students. The insignificant effect of sex in the bivariate case obviously results from a suppressor effect. Girls receive better high school grades than do boys, and controlling GPA reveals that significantly less income is expected from girls than from boys.

It is also striking that neither measured background nor significant other's own income has any effect on income expectations.

Finally, we specify several equations dealing with youth's income aspirations. (Table 17) With the exception of father's occupation, and possibly youth's college plans, our model is not very successful at predicting income aspiration levels. Surprisingly, we find virtually no relationship between youth's income aspirations and the income expectations held for him by his significant others.

C. Conclusion.

In summary, we are most struck by the robust and persistent relationship between the political status of an SO and his political expectations for a youth. As previously mentioned, we would argue that political expectations are more a function of the characteristics of the SO than those of the youth. This pattern, however, does not hold for income expectations.

We also find that negative effects of sex (i.e., the disadvantages associated with being female) to be of interest. Our results show that while girls display higher measured achievement in high school than do boys ($r_{gpa \cdot sex}$=.402), girls both expect less from themselves--both politically and economically--and also find others to expect less from them. While these lowered aspirations and expectations may in fact be realistic responses to extant political and economic structural conditions, we might suggest that these are not terribly encouraging results for those interested in more egalitarian access to these spheres.

XIX. Summary

The preceding paper has identified a problem in the stratification literature, and has described a project designed to assess this problem. Included in the discussion were methods of data collection, sample description, operationalization of variables, measurement issues of validity and reliability, and a multivariate analysis of the data.

FIGURE 1

Status Attainment Model for Four Status Variables[a,b]

	Ego's Significant Others:		Egos:	
Status Content Variables	Mean Status Levels	Mean Status Expectation Levels for Egos	Status Aspiration Level	Status Attainment Level
Occupational Prestige Level				
Educational Level				
Power Level	X	X	X	
Wealth Level (Income)	X	X	X	

[a]Table adapted from Haller and Portes 1973, p. 78

[b]Cells with X's refer to variables dealt with in present paper.

FIGURE 2

Internal Validity for the Aspiration and Expectation Scales

Panel 1 Internal Validity of Political Aspiration Scale N=292	Panel 2 Internal Validity of Income Aspiration Scale N=292	Panel 3 Internal Validity of Political Expectation Scale (N=33)	Panel 4 Internal Validity of Income Expectation Scale (N=22)
$\bar{X}$ RST< $\bar{X}$ IST .4103 .9414	$\bar{X}$ RST< $\bar{X}$ IST 9.9586 13.517	$\bar{X}$ RST< $\bar{X}$ IST .58 .86	$\bar{X}$ RST< $\bar{X}$ IST 12.32 17.97
$\bar{X}$ RLT< $\bar{X}$ ILT .6598 1.4639	$\bar{X}$ RLT< $\bar{X}$ ILT 16.433 21.697	$\bar{X}$ RLT< $\bar{X}$ ILT .80 1.41	$\bar{X}$ RLT< $\bar{X}$ ILT 18.36 27.49
$\bar{X}$ RST< $\bar{X}$ RLT .4103 .6598	$\bar{X}$ RST< $\bar{X}$ RLT 9.9586 16.433	$\bar{X}$ RST< $\bar{X}$ RLT .58 .80	$\bar{X}$ RST< $\bar{X}$ RLT 12.32 18.96
$\bar{X}$ IST< $\bar{X}$ ILT .9414 1.4639	$\bar{X}$ IST< $\bar{X}$ ILT 13.517 21.697	$\bar{X}$ IST< $\bar{X}$ ILT .86 1.41	$\bar{X}$ IST< $\bar{X}$ ILT 17.97 27.49

FIGURE 3

Framework of the Significant Other Elicitor Political Form

There are four pages on each S.O. questionnaire. Each one of these pages tries to elicit a slightly different type of influence:

	DEFINERS	MODELS
SELF	EXAMPLE QUESTION: Who have you talked to about how you could do some good by working with public officials? Focus is on someone who the student actually talked to about his role in the political realm.	EXAMPLE QUESTION: Who do you know who provides an example of the good you might do when working with public officials? The focus is on someone who the student uses as a model for himself. Feeling elicited should be: "I'd like to be like that person some day!"
OBJECT	EXAMPLE QUESTION: Who have you talked to about the good that public officials can do for people? Focus is on someone whom the student has actually talked to about what people can do for others when they are public officials.	EXAMPLE QUESTION: Who by their example (as public officials past or present) have given you an idea about the good that public officials can do for people? The focus is on someone who the student uses as a model of what a public office holder should be like.

In addition, on each page there are four filter questions; by this we mean that people think about (for example) political influence in many ways. We believed in this instance that there were at least four ways that the student might think about political influence. They were: 1) the ability to do good for others as a result of political influence; 2) the way that political influence might help you get ahead, e.g. Who have you talked to about how you might get ahead by becoming active in politics?; 3) the lawmaking function of political influence, e.g. Who have you talked to about how you could have a say about the kinds of laws that are passed?; 4) the type of life that public officials lead, e.g. Who do you know that provides an example of the kind of life you might lead as a public official?

Obviously, there may be other ways of thinking about political influence, these are the ones that we have used.

There are four things that we are trying to find out about people. This form identifies No. 3.

1. Their actual attainment levels (phase one) What do adults actually do?
2. Students aspirations for the future (phase two) What do kids want in the future?
3. Students significant others (phase 2) Who has helped them decide what they want in the future?
4. Significant others expectations (phase three) What do these people actually expect the student will do in the future?

TABLE 1

Questions and Distribution of Responses for Political Aspiration Scale

Q1. Suppose things work out so that you could be as influential as you have ever hoped to be. Which is the highest of these levels of government at which you might succeed in getting elective officials to take action you think is important, by the time you are 25 years old.

N	%	
120	41.1	0. None of the above
90	30.8	1. City or county
57	19.5	2. State
23	7.9	3. National
2	.7	9. Not ascertained
292	100.0	

Q2. Suppose things work out so that you are not very influential. Which is the lowest of these levels at which you are sure you could succeed in getting elective officials to take action you think is important by the time you are 25 years old.

N	%	
184	63.0	0. None of the above
97	33.2	1. City or county
5	1.7	2. State
4	1.4	3. National
2	.7	9. Not ascertained
292	100.0	

Q3. Suppose things work out so you could be as influential as you have ever hoped to be. Which is the highest of these levels of government at which you might succeed in getting elective officials to take action you think is important, by the time you are 45 years old.

N	%	
86	29.5	0. None of the above
55	18.8	1. City or county
79	27.1	2. State
71	24.3	3. National
1	.3	9. Not ascertained
292	100.0	

TABLE 1, Continued

Q4. Suppose things work out so that you are not very influential. Which is the lowest of these levels at which you are sure you could succeed in getting elective officials to take action you think is important, by the time you are 45 years old.

N	%	
149	51.0	0. None of the above
98	33.6	1. City or county
38	13.0	2. State
6	2.1	3. National
1	.3	9. Not ascertained
292	100.0	

TABLE 2

Correlations of Political Influence Aspiration Scale and Other Selected Scales
N=292[a]

M	SD		POL ASP	PINT	GTASP	POL EFF	PKNOW
3.472	2.954	POL ASP	1.0				
2.700	.939	PINT	.217	1.0			
17.096	8.729	GTASP	.312	.090	1.0		
2.320	1.314	POL EFF	.206	.288	.015	1.0	
4.601	2.834	PKNOW	.300	.353	.187	.276	1.0

[a]Pol Asp = Total Political Aspirations; PINT = Political Interest; GTASP = Total Government Office Occupational Aspirations; POL EFF = Total Political Efficacy; PKNOW = Total Political Knowledge.

TABLE 3

Inter-item and Item To Total Correlations
for the Political Influence Aspiration Scale[a]
N=292[a]

M	SD		POLASP1	POLASP2	POLASP3	POLASP4	TPOLASP
.9414	.963	POLASP1	1.0				
.4103	.600	POLASP2	.533	1.0			
1.4639	1.154	POLASP3	.741	.472	1.0		
.6598	.782	POLASP4	.543	.598	.661	1.0	
		TPOLASP	.867	.720	.905	.833	1.0

Alpha Coefficient = .841

[a]POL ASP 1 = Political Aspirations Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term);
POL ASP 2 = Political Aspirations Question 2 (Realistic, Short Term);
POL ASP 3 = Political Aspirations Question 3 (Idealistic, Long Term);
POL ASP 4 = Political Aspirations Question 4 (Realistic, Long Term);
TPOL ASP = Total Political Aspirations.

TABLE 4

Inter-item and Item to Total Correlations
for the Income Aspiration Scale

N=292[a]

M	SD		INC ASP1	INC ASP2	INC ASP3	INC ASP4	TINC ASP
19.8962	9.115	INC ASP1	1.0				
15.0276	7.570	INC ASP2	.749	1.0			
28.0069	11.592	INC ASP3	.571	.431	1.0		
21.8213	10.324	INC ASP4	.511	.598	.814	1.0	
34.7228	32.324	TINC ASP	.6361	.677	.900	.970	1.0

Alpha = .870

R test/retest = .067

[a]INC ASP 1 = Income Aspirations Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); INC ASP 2 = Income Aspirations Question 2 (Realistic, Short Term); INC ASP 3 = Income Aspirations Question 3 (Idealistic, Long Term); INC ASP 4 = Income Aspirations Question 4 (Realistic, Long Term); TINC ASP = Total Income Aspirations.

TABLE 5

Correlation Matrix for Income Aspiration Scale and Other Selected Scales[a]

M	SD		TINC ASP	THOUSE	TCAR
61.528	27.629	TINC ASP	1.0		
17.096	8.729	THOUSE	.423	1.0	
7.369	1.396	TCAR	.284	.298	1.0

[a]TINC ASP = Total Income Aspirations; THOUSE = Total House Aspirations; TCAR = Total Car Aspirations.

TABLE 6

Questions and Distributions of Responses for
Significant Other Political Expectations

Q5. Suppose thing worked out so that (he/she) could be as influential as (he/she) ever hoped to be. By the time (he/she) is 25 years old, what is the highest level of government at which (he/she) might get elected officials to take some action (he/she) thinks is important...

N	%	
49	32.9	0. None at all (Code 8 in col. 29)
63	42.3	1. City or county
26	17.4	2. State
3	2.0	3. National
7	4.7	7. No idea
1	.7	8. Inap, no to A
0	.0	9. Not ascertained
149	100.0	

Suppose things work out so (he/she) is not very influential by the age of 25. What is the lowest level of government at which you are sure (he/she) can get elected officials to take some action (he/she) thinks is important.

N	%	
13	8.7	0. None at all
73	49.0	1. City or county
2	1.3	2. State
0	.0	3. National
10	6.7	7. No idea
50	33.6	8. Inap, no to A, none to Q5
1	.7	9. Not ascertained
149	100.0	

Q6. Suppose things worked out so that (he/she) could be as influential as (he/she) ever hoped to be. By age 45, what is the highest level of government at which (he/she) might get elected officials to take some action (he/she) thinks is important.

N	%	
39	26.2	0. None (Code 8 in col. 31)
30	20.1	1. City or county
44	29.5	2. State
26	17.4	3. National
8	5.4	7. No idea
1	.7	8. Inap, no to A
1	.7	9. Not ascertained
149	100.0	

TABLE 6, Continued

Q6a. Suppose things work out so that (he/she) is not very influential. By the age of 45, what is the lowest level of government at which you are sure (he/she) can get elected officials to take some action (he/she) thinks is important.

N	%	
8	5.4	0. None at all
74	49.7	1. City or county
15	10.1	2. State
3	2.0	3. National
8	5.4	7. No idea
40	26.8	8. Inap, no to A, none to Q6
1	.7	9. Not ascertained
149	100.0	

TABLE 7

Political Influence Expectation Levels for Youths; Significant Others (SO) X Significant Others, Item (Q) X Item, Time$_1$ (T) X Time$_2$ Correlations for Each Youth's First Three SO's

Digit 1 = Time 1XX-2XX Times 1 & 2
Digit 2 = SO X1X-X3X SOs 1, 2 & 3
Digit 3 = Q XX1-XX4 Questions 1, 2, 3 & 4

	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	2 2 2 2	2 2 2 2	2 3 2 2
	1 1 1 1	1 2 2 2	3 3 3 3	1 1 1 1	2 2 2 2	3 3 3 3
	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4	1 2 3 4
111	-- 77 73 56	-08 -07 11 04	13 -11 01 -13	37 32 36 30	23 -11 12 -05	28 07 21 -03
112	77 -- 70 62	-03 -15 -01 -02	17 00 11 -10	31 35 46 41	15 -15 10 -14	33 16 30 -02
113	73 70 -- 86	-21 -27 -17 -18	16 02 -01 -01	48 49 46 48	-15 -20 -15 -34	15 -04 09 -13
114	56 62 86 --	-23 -30 -20 -20	04 14 11 17	42 41 40 47	-25 -37 -25 -42	16 01 06 -04
121	-08 03 -21 -23	-- 76 87 73	-04 -30 11 06	-29 -19 -16 -15	55 50 63 63	33 39 22 29
122	-07 -15 -27 -30	76 -- 75 81	10 -04 15 20	-24 -22 -33 -32	49 65 54 65	33 42 35 48
123	11 -01 -17 -20	87 75 -- 80	02 -31 11 07	-33 -22 -16 -19	56 48 77 67	34 26 20 16
124	04 -02 -18 -20	73 81 80 --	10 -20 20 16	-26 -24 -22 -32	46 60 66 71	38 28 27 21
131	-23 -17 -16 04	-04 10 02 10	-- 75 78 76	-12 -14 -32 -27	-29 -14 -19 -23	29 03 52 16
132	-11 00 02 14	-30 -04 -31 -20	75 -- 63 66	-12 -30 -35 -42	-40 -20 -38 -28	22 11 39 19
133	01 11 -01 11	11 15 11 20	78 64 -- 81	-13 -23 -23 -16	-19 -03 -11 -08	57 39 79 47
134	-13 -10 -01 17	06 20 07 16	76 66 81 --	-26 -37 -30 -32	-14 05 -16 -06	55 46 66 59
211	37 31 48 42	-29 -24 -33 -26	-12 -12 -13 -26	-- 68 74 55	01 -06 -11 -22	-04 -08 -09 -23
212	32 35 49 41	-19 -22 -22 -24	-14 -30 -23 -37	68 -- 66 76	-09 07 01 -08	05 -02 -05 -13
213	36 46 46 40	-16 -33 -16 -22	-32 -35 -23 -38	74 66 -- 82	-17 -25 04 -19	02 -04 -07 -32
214	30 41 48 47	-15 -32 -19 -32	-27 -42 -16 -32	55 76 82 --	-19 -19 -05 -23	06 -03 06 -17
221	23 15 -15 -25	55 49 56 46	-29 -40 -19 -14	01 -09 -17 -19	-- 57 70 57	01 01 -02 -01
222	-11 -15 -28 -37	50 65 46 60	-14 -20 -03 05	-06 07 -25 -19	57 -- 57 80	31 38 22 32
223	12 10 -15 -25	63 54 77 66	-19 -38 -11 -16	-10 01 04 -05	70 57 -- 73	15 04 11 -06
224	-05 -14 -34 -42	63 65 67 71	-23 -28 -08 -06	-22 -08 -19 -23	57 80 78 --	13 21 09 21
231	28 33 15 16	33 33 34 38	29 22 59 55	-04 05 02 06	01 31 15 13	-- 82 79 71
232	07 16 -04 01	39 42 26 28	03 11 39 48	-08 -02 -04 -03	01 38 04 21	82 -- 60 84
233	21 30 09 08	22 35 20 27	52 39 79 66	-09 -05 -07 06	-02 22 11 09	79 60 -- 67
234	-03 -02 -13 -04	29 48 16 21	16 19 47 59	-23 -13 -32 -17	-01 32 -06 21	71 84 67 --

TABLE 8

Inter-item Correlations for Political Expectation Scale

N=33[a]

	TSOQ1P	TSOQ2P	TSOQ3P	TSOQ4P	TSOPEX
TSOQ1P	1.0				
TSOQ2P	.655	1.0			
TSOQ3P	.851	.661	1.0		
TSOQ4P	.665	.670	.790	1.0	
TSOPEX	.906	.798	.955	.895	1.0

R test retest = .754

Alpha Coefficient = .89

[a]TSOQ1P = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); TSOQ2P = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 2 (Realistic, Short Term); TSOQ3P = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 3 (Idealistic, Long Term); TSOQ4P = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 4 (Realistic, Long Term); TSOPEX = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4).

TABLE 9

Correlations of Youth's Political Aspirations With Significant Others' Political Expectations[a]

	POL EXP1	POL EXP2	POL EXP3	POL EXP4	TOTAL POL EXP
POL ASP1	.04	.21	.10	-.03	.15
POL ASP2	.27	.39	.40	.26	.43
POL ASP3	-.13	.03	-.08	-.27	.09
POL ASP4	.05	.08	.18	-.04	.15
TOTAL POL ASP	.03	.17	.13	-.07	.13

[a]POL EXP1 = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); POL EXP2 = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 2 (Realistic, Short Term); POL EXP3 = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 3 (Idealistic, Long Term); POL EXP4 = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations for Question 4 (Realistic, Short Term); Total POL EXP = Total Significant Other's Political Expectations (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4); POL ASP1 = Youth's Political Aspirations Question 1 (Idealistic, Short Term); POL ASP2 = Youth's Political Aspirations (Question 2; POLASP3 = Youth's Political Aspirations Question 3; POL ASP4 = Youth's Political Aspirations Question 4; TOTAL POL ASP = Total Political Aspirations (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4).

TABLE 10

Income Expectations Levels for Youths Significant Other (SO) X Significant Other, Item (Q) X Item, Time 1 (T) X Time 2 Correlations for each Youth's First 3 SO's

Digit 1 = T 1XX-2XX Time 1 & 2
Digit 2 = SO X1X-X3X SO 1, 2, 3
Digit 3 = Q XX1-XX4 Questions 1-4

	111	112	113	114	121	122	123	124	131	132	133	134	211	212	213	214	221	222	223	224	231	232	233	234
111	--	71	75	62	33	26	25	26	11	10	02	-06	47	48	69	59	25	19	29	07	14	29	32	14
112	71	--	63	79	10	20	09	05	23	33	20	34	31	39	47	54	11	15	13	-02	03	18	24	10
113	75	63	--	71	36	27	33	24	21	16	10	09	49	59	67	60	36	32	42	22	19	31	30	19
114	62	79	71	--	25	26	-18	10	29	29	12	13	12	29	45	50	16	25	18	-01	-12	02	09	-02
121	33	26	25	26	--	54	76	63	32	46	16	16	39	38	34	28	55	11	54	29	24	48	18	17
122	10	20	09	05	54	--	61	77	01	-04	-09	-13	44	39	32	19	19	47	51	54	21	42	15	13
123	36	27	33	24	76	61	--	82	36	36	29	10	50	57	48	44	50	31	70	64	36	53	32	24
124	25	26	18	10	63	77	82	--	41	35	24	12	31	32	28	10	22	58	54	70	27	52	27	17
131	11	10	02	-06	32	46	16	16	--	45	66	62	43	19	26	22	19	11	24	18	76	42	58	50
132	23	33	20	34	01	-04	-09	-13	45	--	49	76	25	03	21	11	37	27	41	44	72	45	75	59
133	21	16	10	09	36	36	29	10	66	49	--	76	46	38	25	41	10	-09	04	-00	68	42	75	66
134	29	29	12	13	41	35	24	12	62	76	76	--	28	25	18	12	34	-01	28	27	78	33	72	61
211	47	48	69	59	39	38	34	28	43	19	26	22	--	66	82	62	47	23	44	26	62	56	71	72
212	31	39	47	54	44	39	32	19	25	03	21	11	66	--	55	78	24	05	34	17	44	51	52	66
213	49	59	67	60	50	57	48	44	46	38	25	41	82	55	--	70	39	10	46	12	56	54	65	69
214	12	29	45	50	31	32	28	10	28	25	18	12	62	78	70	--	29	08	40	08	33	39	45	59
221	25	19	29	07	55	11	54	29	19	11	24	18	47	23	44	26	--	57	78	47	29	51	14	45
222	11	15	13	-02	19	47	51	54	37	27	41	44	24	05	34	17	57	--	58	66	23	50	12	47
223	36	32	42	22	50	31	70	64	10	-09	04	-00	39	10	46	12	78	58	--	66	36	53	24	47
224	16	25	18	-01	22	58	54	70	34	-01	28	27	29	08	40	08	47	86	66	--	25	54	20	48
231	14	29	32	14	24	48	18	17	76	42	58	50	62	56	71	72	29	51	14	45	--	96	79	83
232	03	18	24	10	21	42	15	13	72	45	75	59	44	51	52	66	23	50	12	47	96	--	78	85
233	19	31	30	19	36	53	32	24	68	42	75	66	56	54	65	69	36	53	24	47	79	78	--	89
234	-12	02	09	-02	27	52	27	17	78	33	72	61	33	39	45	59	25	54	20	48	83	85	89	--

TABLE 11

Inter-item Correlation for Income Expectation Scale
(N=22)[a]

	TSOIQ1	TSOIQ2	TSOIQ3	TSOIQ4	TSOIEX
TSOIQ1	1.0				
TSOIQ2	.721	1.0			
TSOIQ3	.749	.691	1.0		
TSOIQ4	.754	.896	.777	1.0	
TSOIEX	.912	.871	.930	.925	1.0

R test-pretest = .590

Alpha Coefficient = .883

[a]TSOIQ1 = Total Significant Others Income Expectations for Question one,
TSOIQ2 = Total Significant Others Income Expectations for Question 2,
TSOIQ3 = Total Significant Others Income Expectations for Question 3,
TSOIQ4 = Total Significant Others Income Expectations for Question 4,
Significant Others Income Expectation = (Q1 + Q2 + Q3 + Q4).

TABLE 12

Correlations of Youths' Income Aspirations With Significant Others' Income Expectations[a]

	1 EXP1	1 EXP2	1 EXP3	1 EXP4	TOTAL 1 EXP
1 ASP1	.04	.01	.11	.17	.09
1 ASP2	-.08	-.17	-.09	-.03	-.13
1 ASP3	-.03	.05	.11	.17	.05
1 ASP4	.00	.12	.19	.24	.10
TOTAL 1 ASP	-.01	.03	.10	.16	.04

Income Aspiration (family) 1, 2, 3, 4, and total

Total SO's Expectation Income Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 and total

TABLE 13

Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlation for Major Variables.[a]
N=56

$\bar{X}$	S.D.		TSOPEX	TSPS	TPOLASP	SEX	GPA	RESI	POLEFF	POLINT	TPOLK	COLPLAN	TSOIEX	TIASP	TSOINC	FED	FOCC
3.576	1.517	TSOPEX	1.00														
.763	.552	TSPS	.461	1.00													
3.732	3.018	TPOLASP	.135	.008	1.00												
.607	.493	SEX	-.422	-.364	-.231	1.00											
2.508	.658	GPA	.103	-.066	.011	.402	1.00										
.143	.353	RESID	.209	-.240	.105	.015	-.187	1.00									
2.364	1.310	POLEFF	.252	-.414	-.045	-.068	.307	.004	1.00								
2.554	.913	POLINT	.276	.115	.180	-.195	-.013	-.137	.321	1.00							
4.640	2.716	TPOLK	.090	.292	.211	-.170	-.004	-.134	.112	.538	1.00						
.437	.501	COLPLAN	.303	-.071	.316	-.063	.140	-.051	.192	.291	.144	1.00					
77.770	19.628	TSOIEX	.280	.104	.240	-.151	.458	-.009	.063	.064	.123	.242	1.00				
60.926	30.301	TIASP	.300	.298	.217	-.065	-.026	-.082	-.074	.318	-.099	.240	.039	1.00			
12.066	13.351	TSOINC	.004	.097	-.183	-.487	-.132	-.111	.131	.072	.072	-.217	.042	.197	1.00		
12.171	2.966	FED	.400	.126	.063	-.175	.015	-.118	.457	.255	.090	.188	-.071	.040	-.154	1.00	
38.892	23.033	FOCC	.166	.073	.061	-.147	.133	-.357	.277	.284	-.140	.375	.095	.359	.326	.414	1.00

[a]TSOPEX = Total Significant Others Political Expectations; TSPS = Total Significant Others Political Status; TPOLASP = Total Political Aspirations; SEX = 1 for Females, 0 for Males; GPA = High School Grade Point Average; RESID = Farm/Non-Farm Residence; POLEFF = Political Efficacy; POLINT = Political Interest TPOLK = Political Knowledge; COLPLAN = College Plans; TSOIEX = Total Significant Others Income Expectations (in 1,000's); TIASP = Total Income Aspirations (in 1,000's); TSOINC = Total Significant Others Income (in 1,000's); FED = Father's Education; FOCC = Father's Occupation.

TABLE 14

Standardized Regression Coefficients Describing Relationship of Total Significant Others Political Expectations to Background and Individual Variables (F-levels in paranthesis).[a]

Independent Variables	(1) Beta	(2) Beta	(3) Beta	(4) Beta	(5) Beta	(6) Beta	(7) Beta	(8) Beta	(9) Beta	(10) Beta
TSPS			.461 (14.573)	.417 (13.583)	.354 (8.097)	.332 (8.011)	.485 (18.403)	.592 (21.623)	.503 (22.816)	
SEX					-.293 (5.519)	-.246 (4.319)				
GPA										.103 (.577)
RESID								.339 (8.451)	.375 (12.689	
COLPLAN							.338 (8.921)			
FED	.400 (10.273)			.347 (9.408)		.315 (8.062)			.381 (13.696)	
FOCC		.166 (1.532)								
$\bar{R}^2$	.144	.010	.198	.306	.260	.347	.301	.295	.431	-.008

[a] TSPS = Total Significant Others Political Expectations; SEX = 1 for Females, 0 for Males; GPA = High School Grade Point Average; RESID = Farm/Non-Farm Residence; COLPLAN = College Plans; FED = Father's Education; FOCC = Father's Occupation.

TABLE 15

Standardized Regression Coefficients Describing Relationship of Total Political Aspirations to Background and Individual Variables (F-levels in paranthesis).[a]

Independent Variables	(1) Beta	(2) Beta	(3) Beta	(4) Beta	(5) Beta	(6) Beta	(7) Beta	(8) Beta	(9) Beta	(10) Beta	(11) Beta
SEX		-.231 (3.049)									-.281 (3.752)
GPA									.011 (.007)		.124 (.731)
RESID								.105 (.600)			
TSOPEX			.135 (.996)								
POLEFF				-.045 (.110)							
POLINT						.180 (1.812)					
TPOLK					.211 (2.511)						
FED	.046 (.092)										
FOCC	.043 (.079)										
TSPS							.008 (.004)				
COLPLAN										.316 (5.995)	
$\bar{R}^2$	-.032	.036	-.000	-.016	.027	.015	-.018	-.007	-.018	.083	.031

[a]SEX = 1 for Females, 0 for Males; GPA = High School Grade Point Average: RESID = Farm/Non-Farm Residence; TSOPEX = TSOPEX = Total Significant Others Political Expectations; POLEFF = Political Efficacy; POLINT = Political Interest; TPOLK = Political Knowledge; FED = Father's Education; FOCC = Father's Occupation; TSPS = Total Significant Others Political Status; COLPLAN = College Plans.

TABLE 16

Standardized Regression Coefficients Describing Relationship of Total Significant Others Income Expectations to Background and Individual Variables (F-levels in paranthesis).[a]

Independent Variables	(1) Beta	(2) Beta	(3) Beta	(4) Beta	(5) Beta	(6) Beta	(7) Beta
SEX			-.151 (1.251)	-.399 (10.769)	-.392 (10.245)		-.724 (2.109)
GPA				.618 (25.877)	.619 (24.278)	.458 (14.342)	
RESID					.120 (1.115)		
COLPLAN					.137 (1.465)		
FED	-.133 (0.801)						
FOCC	.150 (1.015)						
TSOINC		-.042 (0.094)					
R^2	-.013	-.017	.005	.319	.325	.195	.004

[a] SEX = 1 for Females, 0 for Males; GPA = High School Grade Point Average; RESID = Farm/Non-Farm Residence; COLPLAN = College Plans; FED = Father's Education; FOCC = Father's Occupation; TSOINC = Total Significant Others Income (in 1,000's).

TABLE 17

Standardized Regression Coefficients Describing Relationship of Total Income Aspirations to Background and Individual Variables (F-levels in paranthesis).[a]

Independent Variables	(1) Beta	(2) Beta	(3) Beta	(4) Beta	(5) Beta	(6) Beta	(7) Beta	(8) Beta	(9) Beta
SEX			-.065 (.228)						
GPA								-.026 (.037)	
RESID									-.082 (.363)
COLPLAN						.240 (3.306)	.123 (.800)		
TSOIEX				.039 (.081)					
TSOINC					.197 (2.173)				
FED	-.131 (.874)								
FOCC	.413 (8.744)	.359 (7.989)					.313 (5.196)		
$\bar{R}^2$	.111	.113	-.014	-.017	.021	.040	.109	-.018	-.012

[a]SEX = 1 for Females, 0 for Males; GPA = High School Grade Point Average; RESID = Farm/Non-Farm Residence; COLPLAN = College Plans: TSOIEX = Total Significant Others Income Expectations; TSOINC = Total Significant Others Income (in 1,000's); FED = Father's Education; FOCC = Father's Occupation.